

PARTNERSHIP FOR AGILE
GOVERNANCE AND CLIMATE
ENGAGEMENT

PACE



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Development**

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Initial Political Economy Analysis and State Diagnostic Work

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About PACE

The Partnership for Agile Governance and Climate Engagement (PACE) is a 48-month UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) funded programme. It aims to support coalitions to influence the government to resolve Nigeria's climate and governance problems affecting the poorest and most vulnerable and hold them accountable for the country's climate change objectives. It is managed by DAI Global UK in association with The Policy Practice, Women Environmental Programme, The International Centre for Energy, Environment and Development, Accountability Lab, Integrity, and Bridge that Gap Nigeria. The programme objectives will be achieved by increasing state government income from internally generated revenue; mainstreaming climate action in the centre of state government policy, planning and budgets; and strengthening election delivery and credibility. PACE will achieve this by working with multi-stakeholder coalitions at the federal and sub-national levels including civil society organisations, the private sector, progressive state governments, and the Federal government, thinking and working politically and using applied political economy analysis, through a Whole of Society approach.

PACE emerges from a rich legacy of over two decades of governance reform efforts in Nigeria, drawing on the successes and lessons learned from previous initiatives. These include the Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn (PERL), the State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC), the State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI), and the State and Local Government Programme (SLGP). The programme is implemented in Kaduna, Kano, and Jigawa in north-western Nigeria, with targeted strategic engagement at the federal and regional levels but aims to influence change throughout all 36 states of Nigeria.

Disclaimer

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Acronyms and Definitions

ACReSAL	Agro-Climatic Resilience in Semi-Arid Landscapes
COP	Conference of Parties
CS	Civil Society
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
GDSI	Gender, Disability and Social Inclusion
ICF	International Climate Fund
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
MAF	Mutual Accountability Framework
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
NCCC	National Council on Climate Change
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PACE	Partnership for Agile Governance and Climate Engagements
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PERL	Partnership to Engage Reform and Learn
PCR	Programme Completion Review
PF	Partnership Fund
RF	Results Framework
SFTAS	State Fiscal Transparency, Accountability and Sustainability
SOF	Strategic Opportunities Fund
TOC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
WASH	Whole of Society
WoS	Whole of Society

Executive Summary

The primary focus of this study is the **climate change preparedness** of the country, and Kaduna, Kano and Jigawa states in particular, viewed from a governance perspective through a political economy lens. It is problem driven and action oriented, designed to engage PACE delivery teams and management in the analysis. It aims to highlight politically smart priorities and opportunities for the programme to target interventions during implementation through its ‘whole of society’ approach. The role of the government, civil society, private sector, media, legislature, etc, are all given consideration, as are the conflict, gender and social inclusion dynamics of each location, and the programme’s proposed delivery mechanisms.

Coordination of climate change action **at national level in Nigeria** needs to be more effective. In the lead-up to COP 29, moderate pressure was applied on the government to convene the National Council on Climate Change (NCCC, inaugurated in February 2023), enabling it to seek climate financing effectively. However, intrigues within the presidency may have dampened this initiative. Rising energy costs and alternative energy solutions proposed by the Renewable Energy Council and other such entities involved in the energy transition plan may push stakeholders to build the necessary momentum for change. Companies like Oando, which stand to gain significantly from the increased uptake of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) and the implementation of the Gas Master Plan, hold the President’s attention and influence over renewable energy plans in the country.

Climate action **in Kaduna State** is ineffective, mainly due to political interests in obtaining external funding. The main ministry responsible for climate action has not been adequately funded or motivated to address these issues, as many individuals within the environment ministry and MDAs are involved in the increasing deforestation of the state, from forest guards to local government and traditional authorities. Although the state government acknowledges climate change as a major issue, it has not prioritized it sufficiently to justify the coordination and resources needed, as climate initiatives are capital-intensive and require long-term investment, making them less appealing to politicians. The new government may still be preoccupied with securing political alliances before investing in climate initiatives, as states cope with reduced federal allocations and broader economic difficulties. Kaduna State is facing a debt burden, including prior WB loans, and its IGR has not reached sustainable levels. However, the opportunity to access external funding sources that are less influenced by public scrutiny via internal and citizen-based accountability mechanisms still exists.

Climate action **in Kano State** needs to be more robust and extensive to encourage government actions. If external funds flow to the Kano State Watershed, Erosion, and Climate Change Management Agency (WECCMA), the new climate change policy can help overcome this inertia. This provides further opportunities for climate financing advocacy and sustainable climate governance, including allocating resources (budget), aligning incentives and motivations for climate action, and making sustainability influenced decisions and investments in environmentally sustainable projects and programs. This could include persuading the government to incentivise companies to engage in climate actions, renewable energy, and afforestation, and incentivise industries to reduce carbon emissions and deforestation.

Limited resources are allocated to coordinate the implementation of existing climate action initiatives and commitments **in Jigawa State**. This issue must become a priority for the state governor to gain the necessary support. Transforming the governor’s 12-point agenda into a structured state development plan, along with constructive consultation and engagement from citizens and securing public support for re-election, could be beneficial. Consequently, advocacy for incentives to stimulate and accelerate investment in renewable energy projects and programs through public-private sector participation in the state may be effective.

In all three states and at national level, critical **priorities and opportunities** for the PACE programme to intervene, to address these challenges, fall into three common categories:

1. Accessing Climate Finance: There is a potential renewable energy boom at play in each state and an energy transition momentum at the national level. The private sector needs to understand the market system, and the government needs to understand the key incentives required to stimulate this boom and boost its energy transition. PACE should support the development of a Market Analysis and Strategy to

properly define the market system for renewable energy and, in particular, highlight the missing supporting functions and pieces on the rules side needed to stimulate the value chain. + <<< include point about domestic vs external sources of climate finance

2. Stimulating Public Awareness: there is huge need and opportunity to stimulate large-scale public awareness campaigns on climate change, in three stages: **A:** to collate information on the nature and evidence of climate change impacts in Nigeria and signpost possible solutions by location. This will give PACE access to a pool of trained experts who can assist with the next level; **B.** to help train citizen groups, beneficiary groups, the National Assembly, MDAs, the Media, and traditional and religious institutions on the imperatives of climate change and the actions that must be taken, followed by; **C.** public-private policy dialogues with the Presidency, Nigeria Governors Forum (NGF), federal financial institutions, and NCCC at the national level, and with Governors, their cabinets, and State WECCMA MDAs at the state level, involving key Private Interests, Civil Society, Academics, and the Organised Private Sector at both levels.

3. Coordinating Climate Action: Mitigating and combatting the effects of climate change requires the coordination of the ‘whole of society.’ This presupposes high awareness and engagement of key policy actors. A solid set of activities is needed to assist Nigeria with accessing international climate finance. This will create the space for facilitating the technical capacity to establish coordination at the highest level through the National Council on Climate Change (NCCC). PACE should also consider helping Federal MDAs locate their roles within a broader national climate action architecture to remove any barriers to cooperation. This is where PACE’s Strategic Opportunities Fund may be utilised to good effect.

The entry point for making a case for coordination at state level would be demonstrating the value that could be stimulated where climate actions are well coordinated. This will come from a well-developed Market Analysis and Strategy for renewables as a cross-cutting market for watershed management, erosion control, agriculture, climate change, etc. This strategy will demonstrate to the private sector and key private interests where the money is and the value of unserved or under-served markets. It will help the government understand how to unlock this value using the climate funds raised and serve as a blueprint for coordination across the whole of government and society in each state.

Development partners working on interrelated governance and climate change challenges over the past 20 years (like ICEED) have learnt that **changes in attitude and behaviour**, within government, the private sector, and among the public, happen when individuals see and feel the **economic benefit** of that change: in the health of their budget (resources), their profit margins, their personal income or their household economy. **Entry points and issues** (i.e. tangible problems with political traction and feasible solutions) with the potential to mobilise and drive collective action across the ‘whole of society’ on these three key priorities (above) will need to be linked with **economic incentives** in line with the current governance and climate challenges, climate actions and stakeholder motivations in each location.

Key actors and institutions providing the most promising entry points for initial engagement include ... X in Kaduna, Y in Kano, Z in Jigawa, and W at national level <<< draw from section 7 once complete

Key issues, capable of aligning economic incentives with the political realities of each location, to be explored and put to the test during early implementation, include ... X in Kaduna, Y in Kano, Z in Jigawa, and W at national level <<< draw from section 7 once complete

Selection of the most promising entry points and issues for PACE interventions will also draw on criteria identified through the programme’s initial climate risk, conflict risk and gender, disability and social inclusion analyses (TORs 6, 11, 12). When combined with those of this analysis (summarised above), they provide a 4-dimensional selection filter to narrow down the wide range of possibilities in each location. Any entry point or issue that meets the criteria from all 4 angles offers the greatest potential to achieve the programme’s wide-ranging objectives and should be given high priority in programme planning.

<<< End on a practical note ... making the case for this inception PEA being a surface / ‘macro’ PEA (given the severely limited TA days/resources available at this stage) ... surfacing possible intervention areas, aimed at systemic reforms (component 2), or issues through which NGCP might support coalitions (component 1) ... which will each (if, as and when required, depending on their prioritisation by the NGCP team based on multiple perspectives) require deeper dive, exploratory engagement to analysis their

‘micro’ political economies (and assess their tangibility, tractability and feasibility) during early implementation. <<< and don’t forget to incorporate reference to the practical delivery mechanisms (issue-based coalitions, technical assistance, strategic opportunities funding, etc)

1.0. Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the Study

This is an **initial ‘surface’** political economy analysis and state diagnosis of interrelated governance and climate change challenges in Nigeria. The primary focus is on ‘climate change preparedness’ from a governance perspective. It aims to highlight politically smart priorities and opportunities for the PACE programme to target interventions during implementation. This will narrow the scope for **subsequent ‘in-depth’ analysis**, post-inception, in selected areas of interventions through exploratory engagement with partners, to better understand the potentials and risks of plausible pathways of change.

Specific objectives of the study are to:

- Scope levels of awareness and preparedness, regarding climate change, social protection, and framing/prioritisation of specific climate change issues.
- Scope the socio-political context and political economy of new administrations, with respect to climate change and social protection in agreed locations.
- Scope and diagnose key climate stakeholders across the whole of society, covering people, institutions, resources, performance, and politics, and the sustainability filter.
- Identify climate change policy issues, priorities, and opportunities, including those integrated into other policy areas.
- Identify key location specific climate action risks and political appetites for these – what are the problems with taking action, how do they happen and how can they be addressed.

These are areas where the programme team currently has limited understanding of the political economy, in contrast to areas of core governance for service delivery (primarily education and health), on which they have a wealth of political engagement and understanding, inherited from the predecessor programmes.

1.2 How the Study will be used by PACE

This study is designed to **engage PACE delivery teams and management** in the analysis, to inform their decisions on a politically smart opening portfolio of interventions. The field study was conducted with their full participation and analysis of the findings and their implications were discussed with the teams during drafting. These were also discussed and cross-referenced with other PACE inception studies supported by **climate, conflict and GDSI experts**, and with those developing PACE’s Theory of Change and Results Framework, feeding into pre-implementation programme strategy and work planning processes.

Additional objectives of the study in this respect are to:

- Scope potential pathways of change, justifying areas of programme engagement/intervention and potential entry points/issues, based on initial assumptions about critical opportunities and risks shaping the programme Theory of Change and research, evidence and learning objectives.
- Diagnose ways forward to engage climate change policies, strategies, and issues in relation to core governance challenges regarding public financial management and the political cycle, including through potential use of PACE’s Strategic Opportunities Fund (SOF).
- Highlight possible entry points for wider intervention by FCDO, regarding related opportunities for UK Trade & Investment, strengthening portfolio co-ordination and planning of social protection.
- Identify guidance questions to help PACE delivery teams assess climate change related ‘state of the state reform commitment’ during implementation, based on an initial situational analysis.
- Promote adoption of politically savvy ways of working in the PACE team based on core principles of Thinking & Working Politically (TWP), including problem-driven and adaptive programming.

2.0. Methodology

2.1 Research Questions

To achieve its objectives, the study set out to answer the following overarching research questions:

1. Why is there limited resource availability, allocation, and release to implement existing governance and climate action initiatives and commitments in the locations in a co-ordinated way?
2. What are the plausible pathways to change to resolve the identified challenges in each location without PACE involvement, given what already has traction with stakeholders?
3. Where else outside of explicit governance and climate change or social protection policy 'boxes' are tractable entry points/issues located? For example, the most significant work might be happening in urban planning and transport, decarbonisation of agriculture, or rural electrification, without being called climate policy or strategy.
4. What areas of interventions are more likely to be effective in pursuing the plausible pathways of change identified in each location?
5. How could PACE delivery teams in the locations think and work politically more effectively?
6. Given the initial Political Economy Analysis, how should PACE structure its grants programme, including the Special Opportunities Fund?
7. Are there policy areas where significant harm is likely to be happening to either climate mitigation or resilience outcomes, which PACE could help to de-risk or more constructively direct? This is also highly likely given the mix of ideas which influence state-level policy, some of which can be outdated or ill-informed.
8. Are there critical knowledge and awareness or engagement gaps, and if so, regarding what?

In the time and resource envelope for inception, the depth and confidence with which these questions can be answered is limited. Possible areas of intervention surfaced through this 'macro' study warranting programme engagement in implementation will require further study/exploration to analyse their 'micro' political economy dynamics within and across the relevant locations during early engagement.

As such, this study is expected to lead to a more in-depth 'post-inception' analysis of possible entry points and issues for programme engagement in selected areas of intervention approved at the end of inception. The above research questions will thus contribute to PACE's 'criteria and method of issue selection'.

2.2 Conceptual Framework: Problem Driven, Action-Oriented

The approach to this study combines use of the latest framework for 'political economy analysis of climate action' designed for development practitioners – on which many of PACE's core team members have been trained – by The Policy Practice, with the latest stakeholder engagement, key informant interview and contextual interpretation techniques, honed over many years, now employed by Integrity Nigeria.

The product, reflected in the structure of this report (sections 3-8), is an analysis that begins by focussing on **the overarching challenge** – that which the PACE programme has been designed to address – and unpacking its various dimensions – elucidated in the programme's high-level theory of change. Given the programme's mandate to intervene, to support local actors to address the challenge, much attention is given to the analysis of **coordination, collective action, and information asymmetry problems** (key elements of game theory). Relevant **institutions** (structures, policies, and strategies) are analysed, as are **the behaviours and motivations of relevant actors** (key stakeholders across the whole of society: beyond government partners, in civil society, the private sector, media, legislature, etc), which together determine the effectiveness of the current arrangements in place to address the overarching challenge. As such, the problem analysis goes beyond analysis of the formal structures, policies, and stakeholders,

to also look at the informal **political clientelism and rent seeking behaviours** (shaping the current political settlement) that contribute to Nigeria's interrelated governance and climate change challenges.

Attention then turns to **priorities and opportunities for intervention** identified through the analysis. In consultation with the programme team, these are explored from the perspective of **plausible pathways of change**, considering the underlying causal mechanisms, the programme's proposed ('whole of society') technical approach, and cross-cutting climate, conflict, gender, disability, and social inclusion objectives, as well as mandate and resource limitations of the programme. Through this, **promising entry points and issues (tangible, tractable, feasible problems capable of driving collective action) for intervention** are identified and prioritised, for initial engagement in conjunction with further in-depth political and contextual analysis of the specific structures, policies, stakeholders, and behaviours in the form of 'action learning'.

Learning from best practice (action learning-oriented PEA) and past mistakes (over-analytical approaches delaying intervention), this analytic framework emphasises **active participation of the programme team at all stages**: in the process of data collection and analysis; in framing the findings in relation to the programme's theory of change, technical approach and intervention planning processes; and to consider the operational implications for how the programme is managed and adapts to changes over time.

2.3 Evidence Gathering Process

The information presented in this report was generated from a variety of sources through different data gathering techniques, following a logical sequence, but employed iteratively:

- **Desk Study:** on academic and programme documents around the PEA of governance and climate change mitigation and adaptation at the national level and in the locations, and initial stakeholder identification. Identification of 'unknowns' and a first sketch of the stakeholder landscape. Review ways in which issues relevant to ICF KPIs can be identified in different state governance contexts, including broad PEA and newly emerging issues around Local Government Areas. Data sources included key stakeholder interviews, academic literature, programme review documents, climate change prognoses/forecasts, policy document review, NDC documents, review of UK ICF KPIs.
- **Visits to Locations:** to confirm findings from the desk study and fill gaps by conducting in-depth interviews with critical respondents. Identify and gather relevant government documents and understand the views of critical actors and other players. This included work with delivery teams in the locations and key respondents to validate findings, at times through focus group meetings. Detailed findings from the desk study and visits to locations are captured, by location, in Annexes 1-4, and summarised in Sections 3-6 of the report.
- **State Diagnostic Work:** situational analysis on a selection of 'reform levers' indicating 'state of the state reform commitment' on governance and climate change in the locations. A full baseline assessment will be conducted in 2025. Provisional findings, captured in Annexe 5 are integrated into the PEA as and where they contribute to the analysis, rather than treated in isolation.
- **Workshops & Team Meetings:** to analyse and frame the findings (from the above) in relation to the programme's Theory of Change, proposed technical approach, intervention design and work planning processes, with each delivery team and core team. Likewise, to discuss the operational implications of the findings with the management team. The output of all these discussions is summarised in Sections 7-9 of the report.

3.0. National Level Analysis

Coordination of climate change action in Nigeria needs to be more effective. In the lead-up to COP 29, moderate pressure was applied on the government to convene the National Council on Climate Change (NCCC, inaugurated in February 2023), enabling it to seek climate financing effectively. However, intrigues within the presidency may have dampened this initiative. Rising energy costs and alternative energy solutions proposed by the Renewable Energy Council and other such entities involved in the energy transition plan may push stakeholders to build the necessary momentum for change. Companies like Oando, which stand to gain significantly from the increased uptake of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) and the implementation of the Gas Master Plan, hold the President's attention and influence over renewable energy plans in the country.

3.1 Portrait of Current Challenges

Nigeria faces significant climate challenges, such as extreme heat, droughts, floods, rising sea levels, deforestation, poor waste management, and irregular rainfall. These issues significantly impact agriculture, water resources, health, and economic stability.

Extreme Heat and Rising Temperatures: Rising temperatures lead to more frequent and intense heat waves, particularly in northern Nigeria. This situation can significantly impact public health, agriculture, and water availability. Extreme heat contributes to heat-related illnesses and increases vulnerability to infectious diseases, especially among the elderly, children, and those without adequate shelter or cooling options. Higher temperatures reduce crop yields, increase water stress, and raise the risk of crop failure, particularly for heat-sensitive crops such as maize, rice, and vegetables.

Drought and Desertification: Northern Nigeria faces severe desertification, especially in states like Borno, Yobe, and Jigawa. This issue arises from decreasing rainfall, overgrazing, and deforestation. Reducing arable land harms the livelihoods of farmers and communities reliant on agriculture, worsening poverty and food insecurity. Drought conditions diminish water availability for drinking, irrigation, and livestock, affecting both rural and urban areas.

Flooding: Nigeria experiences both river and coastal flooding, particularly during the rainy season. The Niger and Benue rivers are prone to flooding, affecting states such as Kogi, Delta, and Anambra. Rapid urbanization, poor drainage systems, and inadequate waste management contribute to urban flooding, especially in cities like Lagos. This disrupts transportation, damages infrastructure, and increases the incidence of waterborne diseases. Floods cause damage to property, farmland, and infrastructure, leading to significant economic losses and the displacement of thousands of people each year.

Rising Sea Level: Nigeria's coastal areas, particularly in Lagos and the Niger Delta, are at risk due to rising sea levels. This phenomenon leads to coastal erosion, submerges low-lying regions, and increases the salinity of freshwater sources. The rise in sea levels threatens communities that rely on fishing and agriculture. Coastal infrastructure, including ports, homes, and businesses, faces potential damage or destruction. As sea levels continue to rise, millions of people in coastal areas may be displaced, significantly impacting urban planning and resource allocation.

Unpredictable and Irregular Rainfall Patterns: Nigeria is facing changes in the timing, intensity, and distribution of rainfall. These changes pose challenges for farming, making traditional planting and harvesting seasons less predictable. Irregular rainfall patterns can cause droughts and floods, depending on the season. Farmers experience uncertainty that affects crop production and food security. Moreover, changes in rainfall influence water levels in rivers and reservoirs, complicating water management and supply for communities, agriculture, and industry.

Impacts on Agriculture and Food Security: Climate impacts, particularly droughts, extreme heat, and irregular rainfall, have reduced crop yields. Staple crops like millet, sorghum, and maize are especially vulnerable. Crop failures and lower agricultural productivity contribute to higher food prices, affecting low-income families and worsening food insecurity. Droughts and heat stress impact livestock health and productivity, posing challenges for pastoral communities and rural economies.

Biodiversity Loss and Ecosystem Disruption: Climate change exacerbates deforestation, desertification, and habitat loss, negatively impacting Nigeria's forests, wetlands, and savannah ecosystems. Species that rely on specific habitats or temperature ranges are at risk, leading to potential declines in biodiversity. Healthy ecosystems provide essential services like clean air and water, which are increasingly threatened by climate change, thus affecting human health and well-being.

Health Impacts from Vector-Borne and Waterborne Diseases: Rising temperatures and increased rainfall can lead to more disease vectors, such as mosquitoes spreading malaria and dengue fever. Flooding and poor sanitation increase the risk of waterborne diseases, including cholera and typhoid, especially in densely populated areas with inadequate infrastructure. This growing disease burden and demand for healthcare strain Nigeria's healthcare system, particularly in underserved rural regions.

Social and Economic Impacts: Climate change disproportionately impacts poorer communities, rural populations, and those dependent on agriculture, worsening poverty and inequality. Climate events such as floods, droughts, and desertification drive internal migration as people seek better living conditions and economic opportunities. This increased migration puts pressure on urban areas, resulting in overcrowding and resource scarcity. The competition for limited resources, particularly land and water, increases tensions between pastoralists and farmers, contributing to conflicts in certain regions.

3.2 Policy Responses & Climate Action

Nigeria has committed to tackling climate change through various policies, renewable energy projects, and adaptation initiatives. However, challenges persist, especially in financing, institutional capacity and coordination, infrastructure resilience, and dependence on oil. **To safeguard livelihoods, infrastructure, and public health, Nigeria must implement coordinated adaptation strategies.** To enhance its climate preparedness, Nigeria will require ongoing international support, a greater emphasis on capacity building, and localised adaptation efforts to address the diverse climate vulnerabilities across the country.

Legal Framework: Nigeria has a National Climate Change Act, signed into law in November 2021, a National Climate Change Policy 2022, an Energy Transition Plan 2022, a National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change for Nigeria 2020, a National Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan for Climate Change in Nigeria 2011, SDG 7, OGP NAP III, and Nigeria's Long Term Low Emissions Development Strategy of 2023, to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. These documents provide the country with the legal framework to achieve its climate change goals and ensure long-term social and economic sustainability and resilience. The 1999 National Constitution also charges all Nigerian states with protecting and improving the environment, including water, air, land, and wildlife, as well as climate change, for which they have all established state ministries of environment.

Overarching Plans: Nigeria has developed the *National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action on Climate Change for Nigeria (NASPA-CCN)*, aimed at reducing vulnerability across sectors and enhancing resilience. It represents a structured approach to addressing the nation's vulnerabilities due to climate change. Established in 2011, NASPA-CCN is part of a broader adaptation initiative aimed at building resilience, particularly by integrating climate responses into government planning and policy across sectors and levels of governance. It encompasses 13 thematic areas relevant to climate resilience, such as water resources, agriculture, health, and disaster management. It focuses on strengthening local capacity, supporting vulnerable groups, and coordinating climate change adaptation policies across various sectors.

Nigeria is a signatory to the Paris Agreement and has made various commitments, including reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing renewable energy. Nigeria's *Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)* under the Paris Agreement outlines specific goals for both mitigation (reducing emissions) and adaptation (adjusting to climate impacts).

Energy Transition & Renewables: The country has a Renewable Energy Council and has set an ambitious *Energy Transition Plan* targeting net-zero emissions by 2060. It has made significant investments in renewable energy and aims to move away from fossil fuels. Nigeria is promoting natural gas as a "bridge fuel" in its transition to cleaner energy, arguing that it can reduce reliance on oil and coal. While this

approach can be beneficial in the short term, it poses long-term challenges if dependency on fossil fuels persists. However, given Nigeria's reliance on oil revenue, transitioning away from oil carries economic risks. Programs like the *Rural Electrification Fund* and partnerships to deploy solar mini grids across rural communities have been instrumental. Nevertheless, access to finance, technology, and infrastructure development limits the large-scale transition needed.

Agriculture and Food Security: Given the high reliance on agriculture for livelihoods, particularly in northern Nigeria, there is a push for climate-resilient agricultural practices, including improved irrigation, drought-resistant crops, and sustainable land management. Nigeria faces severe deforestation and desertification, especially in the northern regions. While afforestation programs (such as the Great Green Wall initiative) aim to restore degraded land, their implementation must be more balanced, and funding limitations should be addressed, as these factors have hindered their impact. Nigeria also has the World Bank funded Agro-Climatic Resilience in Semi-Arid Landscapes (ACReSAL) program, which addresses several agricultural and environmental issues across several states.

Ecological Funds: The ecological fund is an intervention fund established by the federal government. It is specifically designated to address various ecological challenges in communities across the country. Originally set at one percent of the federation account, it was increased to two percent in 1992. Later, one percent of the derivation allocation was added, bringing the total to three percent. States and local governments receive their shares of the derivation and ecology fund from the Federal Account Allocation Committee meetings as part of their monthly allocation. This expenditure level has not yet produced greater resilience against significant ecological issues, such as recurring flooding. For example, in 2024, over five hundred thousand hectares of farmland were submerged.

3.3 Effectiveness of Current Arrangements

The drivers of the political economy of climate change preparedness in Nigeria are complex, involving economic priorities, governance structures, social pressures, and international influences. Moving towards effective climate resilience will require **increased and more effective investment in resilient infrastructure, stronger inter-MDA and federal-state coordination, engagement with the private sector, and public awareness** initiatives. While Nigeria's heavy dependence on oil poses a significant challenge, developing its renewable energy sector and climate-smart agriculture can provide pathways towards a more climate-resilient future. Understanding these drivers can clarify why climate change preparedness in Nigeria faces challenges and identify the potential levers for improved resilience.

Economic Dependence on Oil and Natural Resources: Nigeria's economy heavily relies on oil exports, accounting for a large share of government revenue and foreign exchange earnings. This dependency constrains climate action, making the government more focused on maintaining oil revenues than on investing in green transitions or sustainable infrastructure. The fortunes of Nigeria's ruling, and non-ruling elites are also directly or indirectly linked to the national treasury through the oil and gas sector, its proceeds, and its allied trades and industries. Therefore, weaning Nigeria off fossil fuels must accommodate these elites with alternative cash flows. The fiscal crisis has pushed the Nigerian government to continue relying on fossil fuel revenue, which constitutes a significant stream of the country's income used to fund public expenditure through the annual budget. The new administration has implemented fiscal policy measures to improve revenue through ongoing tax reforms. However, there is not a clear commitment to phase out fossil fuels for renewable energy. The push for global decarbonization threatens Nigeria's economy, as falling global demand for fossil fuels could destabilize its economic foundation. While diversifying the economy is a priority, progress has been slow, limiting the resources available for climate resilience. The rhetoric from the incoming US Republican President also threatens to halt, if not reverse, progress toward greener and more renewable sources.

Governance Structures and Political Will: Nigeria's federal structure divides responsibilities between federal and state governments, creating challenges for coordinated climate action. States are responsible for implementing many adaptation measures but often assert that they lack funds and technical expertise. While climate change has gained attention at the national level, competing priorities – such as security, poverty alleviation, and economic growth – often overshadow climate preparedness. As part of

its commitment to climate action, the Nigerian government enacted the Climate Change Act 2021 and developed a Climate Change Policy for 2021 to 2030, along with an Energy Transition Plan for 2022. The last administration made appreciable progress in implementing the Climate Change Act, particularly with the inauguration of the NCCC and constitution of Board members, with the president as Chairman – alongside MDAs and representatives of non-state actors, as stipulated by law. However, the Climate Change Council requires full implementation.

Political leaders tend to prioritise short-term goals over long-term resilience, especially given limited public pressure for climate action. Turf protection usually prevents federal government MDAs from coordinating their climate actions, as no MDA wishes to cede parts of its budgetary allocations to another. The ongoing governance challenge of corruption in procurement processes makes it advantageous for public servants to work independently of one another whenever possible. Public servants typically have unofficial collaborators, especially among the political and non-political elite, whose private interests they serve, as they do not necessarily work in the public interest.

Funding Constraints and Climate Financing: Nigeria has faced significant funding gaps in financing climate adaptation and mitigation efforts. Although some international funds are available, they are often tied to specific projects, which limits flexibility. High poverty rates and economic inequality also mean the government prioritises immediate economic relief over long-term climate investment.

For example, Nigeria has received funding from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to support climate initiatives and renewable energy projects. In 2019, Nigeria was approved for a \$100 million grant under the Nigeria Solar Independent Power Plant (IPP) Programme. This initiative was part of an effort to catalyse the development of renewable energy infrastructure by creating a debt replacement facility to mitigate investment risks and stimulate private sector involvement. However, this specific programme lapsed in 2021 before its full implementation. The GCF is a fund derived from contributions made by developed countries that are part of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The GCF funds projects that utilise nature-based approaches and new technologies to assist local communities in becoming more resilient to climate change. GCF has reportedly already provided £192.8 million in financing for 15 projects in Nigeria.

A stakeholder said, “You cannot see most of these projects, but the money has been disbursed. Accessing the funds requires high-stakes political connections, mostly initiated from the state level upwards to the federal level. I must be frank: the area you are pursuing is a bit difficult. I have been a member of the NCC Council of Experts since 2014 and have no idea how they dispense the enormous amounts of money they receive. It is high stakes at the highest levels of government, especially at the sub-national level. State governors are the primary cohorts, as no project can be completed without them.”

The Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet (GEAPP) provided \$100 million to the Nigeria Distributed Access through Renewable Energy Scale-Up (DARES) project. (“Nigeria: Green light for project to hook up millions to electricity”). This World Bank-approved initiative aims to provide over 17.5 million Nigerians with access to electricity. The project also includes:

- \$750 million in credit from the International Development Association (IDA).
- Over \$1 billion in private capital.
- Funding from other development partners includes the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), German Development Agency (GIZ), Sustainable Energy for All (SEforAll) in partnership with the United Nations (UN), and the African Development Bank (AfDB).

This is one of the emerging efforts to involve the private sector in climate financing, but this still requires improvement. A lack of incentives, insufficient regulatory frameworks, and limited awareness hinder the private sector’s involvement in climate-related investments.

Nigeria actively seeks international climate finance to support adaptation and mitigation projects. However, the actual transmission of funds to projects still requires improvement, impacting the scale and speed of climate initiatives. The capacity to plan, implement, and monitor climate adaptation is

developing at national and local levels but still needs enhancement. This gap affects the effective execution of climate-related projects and policies, particularly at the state and community levels.

Coordination of Climate Change Actions: This is a significant issue, even at the national level. Climate change actions are often treated as a singular project, but climate change is an evolving and expanding phenomenon that will continue to develop; thus, perceptions must change. Climate change also affects different locations in Nigeria in various ways, necessitating a customized approach for each area. Clear regulations and the identification of responsible agencies for enforcement are needed; however, this is complicated by a lack of data on air, water, and noise quality, as well as the absence of a governing agency. The National Environmental Standards and Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA) regulates industries, while other sectors, such as transport and agriculture, are not fully controlled.

At each location, the Executive captures any internationally funded climate actions. Initially, it may seem logical to have the Executive leadership in charge, as this usually signifies a level of political will or support for projects. However, it increasingly indicates elite posturing to access resources. When such funds arrive, the Water, Environment, and Agriculture Ministries compete over who should control implementation (and therefore a portion of the funds). Others are invited to participate as subordinates at the federal and state levels.

Climate change action seems not to be attractive to wide range of people and doesn't provide an opportunity for raising capital for political settlement/patronage. It wasn't until the lead up to COP28, that the President saw the urgency to inaugurate the NCCC and the available financial opportunities around Climate Change. The recent resignation of the President's spokesman, Ajuri Ngelale, is connected to this situation. He was reportedly given a proposal to present to the President regarding the inauguration of the National Council on Climate Change, which is to be chaired by the President. Surprisingly, he returned with the announcement to stakeholders that he was now the Council Chairman, overseeing ministers and state governors. Reportedly, other members walked out of the first meeting when informed, and in the ensuing intrigues, his position became untenable, leading to his resignation.

Social Pressures and Public Awareness: Public awareness of climate risks could be higher in many parts of Nigeria, particularly in rural areas, where people may perceive climate change as a secondary concern, despite its immediate practical implications. Youth-led organisations and NGOs are increasingly advocating for climate action and adaptation, raising public awareness and applying pressure on policymakers. These movements are gradually gaining influence, particularly in urban areas. A lack of grassroots demand for climate action can diminish political pressure on leaders to prioritise climate preparedness. According to a respondent, "... my most recent information is that the GCF has approved support of US\$2.4 million and disbursed US\$1.6 million for mostly capacity and awareness training for what they refer to as stakeholders – most of these training sessions are conducted abroad," suggesting that even when funds for capacity building and awareness raising are mobilised, this does not necessarily translate into improved capacity or action on the ground.


Agricultural Dependency and Food Security Risks: Agriculture is a primary livelihood for millions of Nigerians, especially in rural areas, and it is susceptible to climate variability. Climate impacts such as drought, flooding, and desertification threaten food security, necessitating adaptation in agriculture. According to a PropCom+ report, government support for rural farmers is limited, and there needs to be better access to climate-resilient seeds and adequate infrastructure (e.g., irrigation and storage), resulting in increased vulnerability, particularly in northern Nigeria. Improving rural resilience requires a sizeable investment. However, this is necessary for national stability and food security. The PropCom+ PEA Report shows that Nigeria has invested significant sums towards improving food security; however, these funds have yet to achieve their intended impacts due to the elite capture of value. To further buttress this point, it should be noted that Nigeria received over US\$480m in financing in the last ten years from the World Bank to modernise its irrigation systems through the "Transforming Irrigation Management in Nigeria" (TRIMING) project; however, the impact on food production and improved rural livelihoods is yet to be seen.

Nigeria's Energy Transition Plan (ETP): Embracing renewable energy can enhance resilience to energy price shocks and reduce dependency on fossil fuels. However, aligning the interests of traditional oil and

gas stakeholders with a renewable agenda remains a significant political challenge. The current politics involve offering CNG at N200 per litre while petrol is priced at N1,160 per litre, attempting to incentivize a switch. Significant companies like Oando, controlled by Wale Tinubu, are expected to be primary beneficiaries of this move, as they have sought government assistance since around 2010 for a switching campaign. The Energy Transition Plan (ETP) was launched in August 2022, identifying a \$23 billion investment opportunity across various projects and programs. The company's share price has sharply increased since Mr. Bola Tinubu became Nigeria's President.

Regional Variability and Climate Vulnerabilities: Climate change impacts vary across Nigeria's regions, from desertification in the north to coastal erosion and flooding in the south. This variability complicates a one-size-fits-all approach, as each location has distinct needs and faces different levels of vulnerability. The uneven effects of climate change necessitate different resource allocations across states. However, regional tensions and competition for federal funds can make the fair distribution of climate resources politically sensitive. Having said that, Nigeria has been setting aside what it calls Ecological Funds. "The reality is that the ecological fund is seen as money to be disbursed to political associates. "A former Speaker of the House of Representatives once called it a ghost fund." ("Where did the ecological funds go?" - Punch Newspapers) It is a ghost because no one knows where it goes. Blessed with the name of the environment, it miraculously finds itself financing dissimilar projects, furnishing offices, purchasing SUVs, and facilitating courtesy visits. It also has a way of influencing the government's body language. When contractors feel that jobs are "just a way to compensate", it is no wonder that most projects are abandoned, and the money embezzled."¹

3.4 Mapping of Key Actors/Stakeholders and Motivations



See Annexe 1 for details and stakeholder index – note: the colours assigned to different stakeholders indicate a common level of power, interest and potential for cooperation/threat (coalition potential?).

International Climate Finance: From the analysis, we see that Nigeria's elites (political and non-political) are driven by the need to capture some or all the value possible by engaging in or leading climate actions. Key Private Interests are already positioned around the energy transition strategy of switching to gas, and they have been ready for this for more than a decade. This new administration's subsidy removal policy and the need for alternatives favour them. Nigeria is facing a cost-of-living crisis and struggles to prioritise

¹ <https://punchng.com/where-did-the-ecological-funds-go/>

anything that does not represent immediate harm. The environmental law principle has long been established (1992 Rio Declaration), which states that the polluter pays, not society, and indeed not the victims of environmental disasters such as cleaning up oil spills. Many developing countries have thus believed the group of industrialised nations responsible for the bulk of the pollution that caused climate change ought to be the ones paying for the climate actions they must take.

From the stakeholder analysis in Annexe 1, Nigeria's presidency, state governors, and key public finance institutions need to become more interested in the need for and the urgency of taking significant climate action. A pathway to international climate finance will be an essential way to engage and hold their interest. To reduce the risk of elite capture of international climate finance, this must be done simultaneously with the other two strategies of raising public awareness and building an effective coordination mechanism for properly governing funds and delivering actions.

Raising Public Awareness: The full scale of Nigeria's climate vulnerabilities and why there must be urgent climate actions is not transparent to all stakeholders who should be key stakeholders in the issue. MDAs responsible for various climate actions, the private sector, civil society, influential groups like traditional and religious institutions, and beneficiary citizen groups like farmers are not fully aware of the phenomenon, its imperatives, and what should be done about it. Engagement (enlightenment plus involvement) of these groups is urgently needed. As for civil society and citizen groups, there is a need to strengthen their voice (empowerment) by equipping them with necessary facts and figures around the plans and financing and by schooling them on their rights, powers and remedies available to them to ensure that there can be massive action (on the scale of Occupy Nigeria and END SARs movement to stimulate urgent government action) and to keep watch over such actions.

Coordination of Climate Action: The biggest impediment to effective coordination of climate actions is the fear of losing out that MDAs currently have. They feel a potential loss of turf (authority, budgets, and a sense of self-importance) and resist change. The presence of climate finance (enlarging the pie for everyone) and public awareness in better understanding on the part of MDAs of why collective action is the only practical approach and more robust demand for service delivery (climate actions) from the public, could help MDAs shift in their position towards greater coordination, particularly when this is mandated from the Presidency and the National Council on Climate Change.

3.5 Priorities and Opportunities for Intervention

Accessing Climate Finance: Key Private Interests (KPIs) like Oando Plc have extensive experience seeking carbon credits and accessing international climate finance. They can play a huge role in Nigeria's energy transition by implementing the Gas Masterplan. Nigeria requires a \$1.9trillion investment to meet the 2060 targets and an additional \$10bn to meet the net zero target. Getting a share of this business would be paramount in the minds of Key Private Interests. PACE should encourage stakeholders to take advantage of this, given Oando's direct access to the presidency, to champion the need for awareness-raising and improved coordination. Oando is listed in several jurisdictions other than Nigeria and has a lot to lose if they operate outside of precise regulation and administrative rules – they are just recovering, having had to withdraw their Canadian listing and other issues of flying too close to the flame cost them their ability to list on the London Stock Exchange. They are very involved in the UN Global Compact and the World Economic Forum, so although they fall into the quadrant of high potential for threat, they also fall into the quadrant of high potential for cooperation. Being the mixed blessing quadrant, one is advised to engage with them and others like them.

Stimulating Public Awareness: The stakeholder power versus interest map in Annexe 1 suggests the opportunity to stimulate large-scale public awareness campaigns. At least on three levels, there is a need for engagement:

- **Level 1:** Support for Nigerian academics, civil society, the Organised Private Sector, and collaborators in the international and donor community to collate information on the nature and evidence of climate change impacts in Nigeria and signpost possible solutions by location. This will give PACE access to a pool of trained experts who can assist with the next level.

- Level 2: Grant support to civil society and other trained actors to help train citizen groups, beneficiary groups (like Farmers Associations), the National Assembly, MDAs, the Media, and traditional and religious institutions on the imperatives of climate change and the actions that must be taken. It should also include training on rights, obligations, processes, and procedures for engaging decision-makers.
- Level 3: Public-private policy dialogues with the Presidency, Governors through the Nigeria Governors Forum (NGF), federal financial institutions (like CBN, FMF and Budget and National Planning), and the National Council on Climate Change (NCCC), Key Private Interests, Civil Society, Academics and the Organised Private Sector.

All three levels can be grant-funded.

Coordinating Climate Action: Mitigating and combatting the effects of climate change requires the coordination of ‘the whole of society.’ This presupposes high awareness and engagement of key policy actors. Facilitating the technical capacity to establish such coordination at the National Council on Climate Change (NCCC) level is necessary. A solid set of activities to assist Nigeria with accessing international climate finance will create the space for this. PACE should also consider helping MDAs locate their roles within a broader national climate action architecture to remove any barriers to cooperation. This is where the Strategic Opportunities Fund may be utilised to build this technical capacity.

4.0. State Level Analysis: Kaduna

Climate action in Kaduna State is ineffective, mainly due to political interests in obtaining external funding. The main ministry responsible for climate action has not been adequately funded or motivated to address these issues, as many individuals within the environment ministry and MDAs are involved in the increasing deforestation of the state, from forest guards to local government and traditional authorities. Although the state government acknowledges climate change as a major issue, it has not prioritized it sufficiently to justify the coordination and resources needed, as climate initiatives are capital-intensive and require long-term investment, making them less appealing to politicians. The new government may still be preoccupied with securing political alliances before investing in climate initiatives, as states cope with reduced federal allocations and broader economic difficulties. Kaduna State is facing a debt burden, including prior WB loans, and its IGR has not reached sustainable levels. However, the opportunity to access external funding sources that are less influenced by public scrutiny via internal and citizen-based accountability mechanisms still exists.

4.1 Portrait of Current Challenges

Kaduna State is vulnerable to the same climate impacts as the rest of Northern Nigeria, which have been listed in the National Level Analysis. These include rising temperatures, drought, irregular rainfall, flooding, desertification, and biodiversity loss. These factors threaten agriculture, food security, public health, and economic stability, creating complex challenges that require robust adaptation and resilience-building strategies. Addressing these climate vulnerabilities is crucial for safeguarding livelihoods, promoting sustainable development, and maintaining social cohesion. Kaduna State is particularly susceptible to the following climate impacts:

Erratic Rainfall and Changing Rain Patterns: Kaduna lies in the Guinea Savanna and Sudan Savanna zones, which are characterised by distinct wet and dry seasons. However, climate change has led to increasingly erratic rainfall patterns, including delayed rain onsets that disrupt traditional farming calendars. Farmers encounter challenges in timing crop harvests due to unpredictable cessations and intense rainfall events, which result in flash floods, soil erosion, and the destruction of farmlands.

Flooding in Urban Areas: In Kaduna City and other urban areas, poor drainage systems exacerbate the effects of heavy rainfall, leading to urban flooding. This affects infrastructure, displaces residents, and causes economic losses, particularly in low-income neighbourhoods.

Drought and Desertification in Northern Kaduna: The northern regions of Kaduna State, bordering the Sahel area, are increasingly affected by desertification. The reduction in vegetation cover caused by unsustainable agricultural practices, deforestation, and prolonged dry spells leads to water scarcity and decreased agricultural productivity.

Agricultural Impacts and Food Insecurity: Agriculture, the backbone of Kaduna's economy, is particularly vulnerable to climate variability. This can result in crop failures and declining yields (e.g., maize, millet, and sorghum) due to inconsistent rainfall. Increased pest infestations, such as fall armyworms, which thrive in warmer conditions, and livelihood challenges for farmers and herders exacerbate conflicts over land and water resources.

Health Challenges: Kaduna's changing climate worsens health risks from heatwaves caused by rising temperatures, which increase heat-related illnesses. It also leads to waterborne diseases from flooding and poor sanitation, contributing to outbreaks of cholera, typhoid, and malaria. Shifting rainfall patterns create breeding grounds for mosquitoes, increasing malaria transmission.

Energy and Hydroelectric Challenges: Kaduna relies on hydropower from dams like Gurara and Shiroro. However, erratic rainfall impacts water levels, reducing electricity generation, affecting industries, businesses and households.

Forest and Biodiversity Loss: Kaduna's forests, such as the Kagoro Forest Reserve, are threatened by deforestation for agriculture, fuelwood, and charcoal production. Deforestation reduces biodiversity, contributes to habitat loss, exacerbating climate change effects through reduced carbon sequestration.

Conflict and Migration: Climate impacts, such as desertification and drought, intensify competition for resources like arable land and water, escalating conflicts between farmers and herders in Kaduna's rural areas. This has led to displacement and migration, particularly among vulnerable populations.

4.2 Policy Responses & Climate Action

Kaduna State has made some progress in preparing for climate change, demonstrating awareness of the need to build resilience. However, it still faces considerable challenges in implementing effective climate adaptation and mitigation strategies. Below is an overview of Kaduna State's current range of policies and interventions:

Policy and Institutional Framework: Kaduna State has a climate change policy framework that reflects its intent to address climate risks. The policy aligns with Nigeria's National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action on Climate Change and supports the country's broader goals under the Paris Agreement. It emphasises sustainable development, disaster risk reduction, and improved climate resilience. The state has designated environmental and natural resource agencies to oversee climate actions, with some departments focusing on climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture, water resources, and energy.

Climate Change Tagging of Budgets: Kaduna State's Budget and Planning process has been implementing a Climate Change tagging of all budget expenditures for the last three years to identify those with Climate Change components and implications. **These are not tagged in the Budget document itself. Rather they are identified and tagged on separate excel sheets.** The total budget expenditure **allocation** for 2024 is about 458 billion Naira, of which **16.7 billion** Naira has been tagged as relating to Climate Change **mitigation or adaptation**. This initiative started in 2018 under the previous administration and was signed and rolled out in 2024 by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources.

Renewable Energy and Green Technology: Kaduna has initiated renewable energy projects, including solar power solutions for rural electrification and public buildings. Solar installations provide critical energy for remote areas, especially for schools and healthcare centres. Scaling these projects is key, as many rural communities remain energy poor. Efforts to promote green building practices have been ongoing, although implementation is challenging due to the high cost of eco-friendly materials and inadequate enforcement of building regulations.

Agriculture and Food Security: Agriculture is a critical sector for Kaduna, where climate-smart techniques, such as drought-resistant crop varieties, improved irrigation, and soil conservation, are being promoted. Local agricultural extension programs and partnerships with NGOs support agricultural resilience, though many farmers still face barriers to accessing these resources. With variable rainfall and increasing drought risk, the state has prioritised water management practices, such as dam maintenance and efficient irrigation. However, further investment in water infrastructure and conservation practices is essential to avoid resource depletion and manage the impacts of prolonged dry spells.

Disaster Preparedness and Early Warning Systems: Kaduna experiences both floods and droughts, necessitating proactive disaster preparedness. While the state has initiated flood mapping and early warning mechanisms, the infrastructure for flood control, such as drainage systems and flood barriers, needs expansion and regular maintenance, especially in flood-prone urban areas. Efforts to develop community-based early warning systems are helping to raise awareness and improve emergency responses in vulnerable regions. However, these systems require further enhancement to reach remote communities and effectively provide timely alerts.

Afforestation and Land Restoration Initiatives: Kaduna is part of Nigeria's broader reforestation efforts, including the *Great Green Wall* initiative to combat desertification in northern Nigeria. The state promotes tree-planting campaigns and sustainable land management practices, helping to reduce soil erosion and restore degraded lands. Protecting Kaduna's forested areas is a priority, but enforcing laws against deforestation and land encroachment is challenging due to illegal logging, agricultural expansion, and limited monitoring resources, many of which being encouraged by Forest Rangers.

Public Awareness and Community Engagement: Kaduna is initiating efforts to raise awareness about climate change, primarily through schools, NGOs, and community programs. Youth involvement in

climate action is growing, with local groups and environmental clubs promoting sustainable practices and conservation. Local communities are now more involved in resilience-building activities, including sustainable agriculture workshops, conservation training, and risk preparedness seminars. However, these programs often rely on NGO support. Scaling them to reach all communities remains challenging.

4.3 Effectiveness of Current Arrangements

The political economy of climate change preparedness in Kaduna State is influenced by a unique mix of governance dynamics, economic factors, social and environmental challenges, and external pressures. Kaduna's central location in Nigeria and its financial, agricultural, and security significance make climate change preparedness particularly critical for the state. Here is an overview of the key drivers limiting the effectiveness of climate preparedness in Kaduna:

Public Awareness and Community Engagement: Despite Kaduna State's efforts to raise climate change awareness through schools, NGOs, and community programs, public awareness remains very poor. This includes both the public and policymakers, particularly at highest levels. Consequently, they do not view climate change as a clear and present danger. This mindset has turned climate change into a low policy priority, resulting in minimal state funding, expecting it to be covered by donors and foreign organisations.

Governance and Political Will: Kaduna State has shown interest in establishing environmental policies, but it needs a comprehensive climate adaptation strategy. While the Ministry of Environment addresses climate-related issues, broader environmental and agricultural policies often neglect climate action. This situation is worsened by the lack of a coordinated structure or mechanism to address agency turf protection tendencies amid overlapping statutory mandates and responsibilities from constitutional laws and legal provisions. Although political leaders in Kaduna may recognise climate risks, they face competing priorities, including poverty alleviation, security, infrastructure development and political patronage. With limited funding and pressing social and political needs, climate change preparedness can sometimes be deprioritised in favour of short-term development or political goals.

The absence of coordination is further compounded by rivalry between the major climate-impacted MDAs, such as Environment, Agriculture, and the Office of the Special Assistant to the Governor on Climate Change, headed by Yusuf Amoke, a Climate Change and environmental activist for more than ten years. There is, however, a proposal by him to the Governor for:

- a) Establishment of a Kaduna State Climate Change Council similar to the federal one.
- b) Establishment of an inter-ministerial Committee to support the yet-to-be-set-up Council
- c) Massive and widespread training, enlightenment, and advocacy on Climate Change for the general public, all civil servants and policymakers.
- d) A Study Tour of Lagos and Yobe states indicted they have done relatively better on climate change resilience and adaptation implementation structures.
- e) An online portal was suggested for recording and tracking voluntary compliance related to climate change, as well as verifying climate change mitigation and adaptation activities.

Funding Constraints and Resource Allocation: Like other Nigerian states, Kaduna relies on federal allocations and international support for major climate projects. This dependence limits its ability to autonomously fund local climate adaptation or resilience projects, making it vulnerable to shifts in national funding priorities. Despite an increase in the state's Internally Generated Revenue, inadequate funding for climate change activities has been allocated, allowing the government to prioritise sectors such as education, health, and infrastructure. Under El-Rufai, the government's main focus was urban renewal and infrastructure development. However, the new administration is shifting towards rural development, emphasising agricultural advancement and the provision of subsidised inputs, especially fertiliser, which ironically contributes significantly to land degradation and climate change issues. The private sector has played a limited role in Kaduna's climate initiatives. Few incentives exist for private investment in climate resilience, but partnerships with NGOs and international organisations help bridge


some funding gaps. Expanding private sector engagement in climate-smart agriculture, renewable energy, and infrastructure represents a potential growth area.

Kaduna State Ministry of Environment: The Ministry of Environment has historically received little political attention and funding from state leaders. The staff view it as a “Siberia,” with one of the lowest levels of internally generated revenue and budget allocations annually and one of the poorest cash release rates against budget allocations. A respondent suggested that tree-felling fees are the primary source of internally generated revenue within the Kaduna State Environmental Protection Agency (KEPA). They indicate a racket is going on in collusion with LGA staff and traditional rulers. However, bandits have recently taken over control and collection of revenue from the tree felling business due to their complete hold over most of the forest areas within the state. This may have inadvertently led to a good outcome as the Permanent Secretary acknowledges that “as a result of the take-over of the Birnin Gwari forest areas by bandits, the forest that was previously depleted and disappearing is coming back to its natural state.”

Capacity Building: The recent national Climate Governance Ranking places Kaduna State 16th out of 36 states. This outcome is perhaps unsurprising, as the Ministry of Environment and its agencies reportedly have limited human resources and skills, with little room for capacity building. The Kaduna State Environmental Protection Agency (KEPA) has only six staff members. The Partnership to Engage, Reform, and Learn (PERL) conducted a corporate planning and job description development exercise for the Ministry. Few donor programs, such as ACReSAL, have implemented mitigation and adaptation activities. This has led to each ministry claiming ownership and engaging in aggressive turf protection (particularly between Environment and Agriculture). Nevertheless, the Ministry plans to create a Climate Change Department and has requested approval from the Office of the Head of Service.

Climate Adaptation Planning: Discussions with some stakeholders, including directors from Budget and Planning, revealed that they feel there are several gaps and issues that the policy and the state government’s approach to climate change have failed to address. Citizens have alleged that the document is simply a copy and paste of the federal version because the consultants neglected to change some labels from federal to Kaduna state in the final printed document for Kaduna. Since the official launch of the policy, the government has not developed an implementation plan, which has left stakeholders confused and inactive. However, there are plans for an FCDO Programme to fund the implementation plan’s development. The general perception is that climate change is a cash cow for foreign funds that can be used for public and personal purposes.

4.4 Mapping of Key Actors/Stakeholders and Motivations



See Annexe 2 for details and stakeholder index – note: the colours assigned to different stakeholders indicate a common level of power, interest and potential for cooperation/threat (coalition potential?).

Aggressive Search for Climate Finance: All hands would have to be on deck to raise the climate finance needed in a state like Kaduna. This presents a unique opportunity to empower Civil Society Organisations (CSO), the State House of Assembly (SHA), the Organised Private Sector (OPS) and the Media (MED) to join Key Private Interests (KPIs) – the trusted advisers of the Governor, in presenting alternatives and linkages through which the State can raise the climate finance it needs – it should also strengthen the moral right to get involved in tracking the utilisation of such funds. This would manoeuvre them into a position where the Governor would have to reckon with them on this issue. To achieve this, the PACE Programme must provide extensive training, facilitation, research, and signposting.

Raising Public Awareness: All the MDAs involved in Watershed, Erosion, and Climate Change Management (WECCMA) (such as Agriculture, Environment, Environmental Protection, Energy, Water Resources, and Emergency Management), along with those needed in impact management, such as Local Government Affairs, Housing and urban development, Traditional and Religious Institutions, CSOs, Academics, and Citizen Groups, need to be made aware of the imperative of embarking on climate action.

Coordination of Climate Action: Whereas the Governor sees a clear pathway to funds for climate actions and other stakeholders are well trained, the rationale and mechanisms for coordination become relevant and vital tools. Where the different stakeholders are involved in the aggressive search for climate finance, the case for their inclusion and legitimacy in coordinating implementation could be strengthened. Such effort should include the Governor's trusted advisors (key Private Interests).

4.5 Priorities and Opportunities for Intervention

Accessing Climate Finance: There is a potential renewable energy boom at play in each state. The private sector needs to understand the market system, and the government needs to understand the key incentives required to stimulate the boom. PACE should provide funds to develop a Market Analysis and Strategy document to properly define the Market System for renewable energy and in particular, highlight the missing supporting functions and pieces on the rules side needed to stimulate the value chain. Implementing this will lead to a private sector investment in renewable energy boom where sums more significant than the climate finance raised could be called into play. This should help the Governor, and vital private interests see that there is a bigger pie possible and that more value is to be shared by allowing the proper implementation and coordination of climate actions. Given an enabling state environment driven by business opportunities and state energy independence, the climate finance funds could be used effectively. This would be the argument for allowing the private sector and civil society organisations to get involved in attracting climate funds to Kaduna State.

Stimulating Public Awareness: As proposed at the federal level, this should be conducted using the PACE grant funding mechanism at three levels.

- **Level 1:** Support for academics, civil society, the Organised Private Sector, and collaborators in the international and donor community to collate information on the nature and evidence of climate change impacts in Kaduna State possible solutions. This will give PACE access to a pool of trained experts who can assist with the next level.
- **Level 2:** Grant support to civil society and other trained actors to help train citizen groups, beneficiary groups (like Farmers Associations), the State House of Assembly, MDAs, the Media, and traditional and religious institutions on the imperatives of climate change and the actions that must be taken. It should also include training on rights, obligations, processes, and procedures for engaging decision-makers.
- **Level 3:** Public-private policy dialogues with the Governors, his cabinet, Kaduna State WECCMA MDAs, Key Private Interests, Civil Society, Academics and the Organised Private Sector.

Coordinating Climate Action: The entry point for making a case for coordination would be demonstrating the value that could be stimulated in the state where climate actions are well coordinated. This will come

from a well-developed Market Analysis and Strategy for renewables as a cross-cutting market for watershed management, erosion control, agriculture, climate change, etc. This strategy will demonstrate to the private sector where the money is and the value of unserved or underserved markets. It will help the government understand how to unlock this value using the climate funds raised and serve as a blueprint for coordination across the whole government and society in Kaduna State.

5.0. State Level Analysis: Kano

Climate action in Kano State needs to be more robust and extensive to encourage government actions. If external funds flow to the Kano State Watershed, Erosion, and Climate Change Management Agency (WECCMA), the new climate change policy can help overcome this inertia. This provides further opportunities for climate financing advocacy and sustainable climate governance, including allocating resources (budget), aligning incentives and motivations for climate action, and making sustainability influenced decisions and investments in environmentally sustainable projects and programs. This could include persuading the government to incentivise companies to engage in climate actions, renewable energy, and afforestation, and incentivising industries in Kano to reduce carbon emissions and deforestation.

5.1 Portrait of Current Challenges

Kano State is vulnerable to the same climate impacts as the rest of Northern Nigeria, which have been listed in the National Level Analysis. These include rising temperatures, drought, irregular rainfall, flooding, desertification, and biodiversity loss. These factors threaten agriculture, food security, public health, and economic stability, creating complex challenges that require robust adaptation and resilience-building strategies. Addressing these climate vulnerabilities is crucial for safeguarding livelihoods, promoting sustainable development, and maintaining social cohesion in Kano State.

Kano State is a major economic and cultural hub within the northern region. The interplay of climate impacts on agriculture, water, and energy affects Kano's economy more acutely than in less industrialized states. Its climate impacts are shaped by its semi-arid environment, dense population, and heavy reliance on agriculture and trade. With one of the highest population densities in Nigeria, Kano faces intensified resource stress and urbanization challenges.

Kano State is particularly susceptible to the following climate impacts:

Increased Pressure on Agriculture: Kano's agricultural sector relies heavily on irrigation from the Kano River and its dams, including Tiga and Challawa Gorge Dams. Unpredictable rainfall and declining water levels significantly affect crop production. Due to drought and changing rainfall patterns, staple crops such as millet, maize, sorghum, and groundnuts are experiencing reduced yields. Fertile, low-lying floodplains, Fadama, are increasingly degraded by overuse, water scarcity, and erosion.

Water Scarcity: Kano's large population and industrial activities increase water demand, worsening shortages during dry seasons. Overreliance on boreholes and declining rainfall recharge rates diminish groundwater availability. Reduced inflow to dams adversely affects irrigation, hydroelectric power, and the water supply for domestic and industrial use.

Flooding in Urban and Peri-Urban Areas: Urbanization and inadequate drainage systems make Kano City prone to flooding during heavy rains. Flash floods disrupt transportation, damage infrastructure, and displace low-income communities residing in poorly planned areas. Agricultural lands in flood-prone regions also suffer from waterlogging, harming crops.

Dust Storms and Air Quality Issues: Kano experiences frequent harmattan winds and dust storms, intensified by desertification and land degradation. Increased dust levels reduce air quality, impacting respiratory health, especially in densely populated areas. Additionally, industrial emissions further exacerbate air pollution in Kano City.

Desertification and Land Degradation: The northern part of Kano State is particularly vulnerable to desertification due to overgrazing, deforestation, and unsustainable farming practices. Encroaching desert sands reduces arable land, threatening livelihoods and exacerbating poverty in rural areas.

Farmer-Herder Conflicts: Competition over dwindling resources, such as grazing land and water, has intensified conflicts between farmers and herders. Kano's dense population and limited arable land make it a hotspot for these disputes.

Impact on Commerce and Trade: Climate change impacts on agriculture affect Kano's position as a key hub for agricultural trade in northern Nigeria. Floods and extreme weather events disrupt transportation infrastructure, hindering commerce and economic growth.

Health Impacts: Rising temperatures and poor air quality increase the prevalence of heat-related illnesses and respiratory conditions. Stagnant water from floods contributes to outbreaks of waterborne diseases such as cholera and typhoid. Changing climate patterns create favourable conditions for vector-borne diseases like malaria.

Impact on Traditional Industries: Traditional industries like leather tanning and textile production rely on water and agricultural inputs. These industries are negatively impacted by water scarcity and decreasing crop yields. Additionally, heatwaves and environmental stress can reduce productivity in these labour-intensive sectors.

5.2 Policy Responses & Climate Action

The following is an overview of Kano State's climate change readiness:

Policy and Institutional Framework: Kano recently developed a policy for climate change adaptation and environmental management, which aligns with Nigeria's National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action on Climate Change. The Ministry of Environment and Agriculture leads climate-related initiatives, but scarce resources and limited capacity often constrain the state's efforts. Additionally, coordination among sectors, particularly for urban and rural climate adaptation, remains a challenge.

Renewable Energy and Sustainable Energy Initiatives: Given Kano's high solar potential, the state has invested in small-scale solar projects, some supported by FCDO, particularly for rural electrification and powering public facilities such as health centres and schools. These projects provide a sustainable energy source and support off-grid communities. While solar power shows promise, scaling up renewable energy remains challenging due to high costs, limited technical support, and reliance on federal and external funding. Kano's energy needs, especially in urban areas, far exceed current renewable energy installations.

Water Resource Management and Drought Mitigation: Kano has made efforts to improve water resource management through dam projects, irrigation schemes, and rainwater harvesting to support agriculture. The *Challawa Gorge* and *Tiga Dams* play crucial roles in water storage for both agricultural and urban use, though maintenance and expansion are needed to meet growing demands. As drought and desertification intensify in northern Nigeria, Kano has engaged in desertification control measures, including afforestation, water conservation, and soil erosion control. However, desert encroachment remains a pressing issue, with many communities still vulnerable to water scarcity.

Kano State Watershed, Erosion and Climate Change Management Agency (WECCMA): The WECCMA Policy document gives it the power to develop policy, even though the Ministry of Environment is also meant to be in charge of policy. The Executive Secretary of WECCMA acknowledges the importance of the Policy and what it can unlock. The policy document was validated on November 7th, 2024, and approved by stakeholders. The document development process involved mainly Kano State MDAs, and no private sector actors were invited or involved. They envisage the development of an Implementation Plan and a stakeholder engagement plan as the next step. The planned activities of WECCMA include mitigations:

- Solar Energy – streetlights and lightening public offices, energy-saving cook stoves – carbon tracing, and a carbon registry.
- Redevelopment of community forests through CBO-assisted training, seedling distribution, and planting of economic trees in rural areas while promoting beautification in urban areas to achieve net zero balance.
- Climate Change Clubs to catch the youth and to introduce competitions and prizes – and to provide support similar to CBOs.
- Challenge seedling production and the creation of nurseries at CBO and school levels.

- Farmer Orchard for individual farmers – fencing and provision of economic tree seedlings.
- Penalties for charcoal use.
- The introduction of emission meters for industries to determine charges for exceeding levels, which will need to be politically smart.

Climate-Resilient Agriculture: Kano’s economy heavily relies on agriculture, making it vulnerable to climate impacts. To improve resilience, climate-smart agricultural practices—such as drought-resistant crops, crop rotation, and sustainable irrigation—are being promoted. However, access to resources and technical support remains limited. KNARDA has an extension delivery system with extension workers at each ward level that can be used for dissemination. KSADP has empowered over 2,000 of these workers to provide farmers with information on sustainable practices, though limited funding restricts their reach.

Disaster Preparedness and Early Warning Systems: Kano has a basic early warning system, but it needs further development to reach all vulnerable communities and improve response times. Seasonal flooding in some areas and drought in others require a well-coordinated disaster response; however, limited resources often hinder the effectiveness of these systems. Some NGOs and local groups are engaged in community-based climate education and preparedness, teaching communities about flood and drought risks. Nevertheless, these initiatives remain sparse and are not yet a core component of Kano’s disaster response strategy.

Public Awareness and Community Engagement: Climate awareness and environmental education are growing, driven mainly by NGOs, schools, and youth organisations. These initiatives focus on conservation, climate literacy, and sustainable farming practices, but scaling them up requires more institutional support from the state government. Kano’s youth and civil society organisations are increasingly involved in climate action and environmental campaigns, advocating for sustainable practices and climate resilience. However, these initiatives are often localised and need broader support to make an impact.

5.3 Effectiveness of Current Arrangements

The political economy of climate change preparedness in Kano State is shaped by various socio-economic, environmental, political, and institutional factors. As the most populous state and an economic hub for northern Nigeria, its state of readiness for climate change is crucial. However, it faces significant challenges, including resource dependency, environmental pressures, and infrastructure limitations. Below are the key drivers influencing Kano’s approach to climate change resilience:

Governance and Institutional Capacity: Kano’s institutions, while active, have a limited capacity for managing complex climate adaptation and resilience strategies. Agencies responsible for agriculture, water, environment, and planning often work in silos, which reduces the effectiveness of cross-sector climate adaptation. Although state leaders recognize climate risks, the political priority given to climate adaptation can be inconsistent. The will to coordinate climate action across the entire government has not been demonstrated. As with other locations, competing needs for immediate economic development, security, and poverty alleviation often take precedence over long-term climate planning.

Kano State Watershed, Erosion and Climate Change Management Agency (WECCMA): WECCMA succeeded the NEWMAP project, inheriting its assets and liabilities. NEWMAP was a \$200 million program for erosion control. WECCMA focuses on erosion and climate change, while ACRESAL handles ecosystem restoration. It is counterpart-funded so that the state can provide up to N2 billion, but Kano chose to provide only N500 million. It is under the direct supervision of the governor, as in other states, although it is part of the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change. The Executive Secretary is Dr. Muhammad S. Khalil, who is very close to Kwankwaso and a prominent member of his Committee of Scholars. This committee consists of beneficiaries and graduates of Kwankwaso’s PhD program, which allowed them to study abroad during his second term as governor. The committee played a crucial role in the 2023 gubernatorial campaigns, and he rewarded them afterwards with critical political positions. The head of this committee is Dr. Yusuf Ibrahim Kofar-Mata, currently the Commissioner for Higher Education and a close associate of Kwankwaso.

The Commissioner of the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change is Nasiru Sule Garo, a former member of the House of Representatives and brother-in-law of Kwankwaso. He is also the younger brother of Murtala Sule Garo, the previous influential commissioner for Local Government under Governor Ganduje. He lacks experience in climate change issues and public administration, having never held any significant position in public administration. The Executive Secretary of WECCMA has overshadowed him due to his expertise in environmental issues, connection to Kwankwaso, direct control over the climate change budget, and access to upper management and power in the state.


Dependence on Federal Funding and External Support: Like most other state governments in Nigeria, Kano relies heavily on federal allocations for significant projects, including climate adaptation initiatives. Limited funding autonomy constrains the state's ability to address its specific climate vulnerabilities with locally tailored solutions. External funding from international donors, development agencies, and NGOs plays a vital role in Kano's climate preparedness initiatives. However, these funds are often limited to specific projects and may not be sustainable for longer-term, integrated adaptation strategies.

Economic Dependence on Agriculture and Industry: Like most northern Nigerian States, Kano's economy is highly dependent on agriculture, which employs a significant portion of its population. This sector is particularly vulnerable to climate-related events, such as droughts, unpredictable rainfall, and floods, which directly threaten food security, rural livelihoods, and economic stability. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Agriculture often plays a secondary role in climate change issues, including policy development. There are also many duplications in mitigation efforts, such as tree planting and seedlings, as MDAs attempt to safeguard their interests. The same situation occurs between Water Resources and the Ministry of Environment and at the level of programs and projects like the Ecological Fund, ACRoSAL, and WECCMA, which do not take directives from their respective Commissioners but report directly to His Excellency, the Governor. Kano also has a significant manufacturing sector, relying on steady water and energy supplies. Industrial activity is affected by climate impacts on water availability and energy reliability, as well as by climate-related disruptions in infrastructure, which affect production and transportation.

Public Awareness and Civil Society Engagement: Public awareness of climate change must increase in every location, with Kano being no exception. Currently, there are no engagements with agricultural CBOs and farmer-based organizations regarding climate change. A strong need exists for stakeholder identification, mapping, and analysis. This lack of awareness is especially true in rural communities, where immediate concerns such as food security, water access, and livelihoods prevail. Building public awareness is crucial for fostering community resilience and supporting adaptive behaviours. Local NGOs, youth organizations, and international development partners can play significant roles in raising awareness, advocating for climate action, and implementing adaptation projects.

5.4 Mapping of Key Actors/Stakeholders and Motivations

Stakeholder Pain Points



See Annex 3 for details and stakeholder index – note: the colours assigned to different stakeholders indicate a common level of power, interest and potential for cooperation/threat (coalition potential?).

Accessing Climate Finance: Of all the locations, Kano appears ready to mitigate the harm done by modern and traditional industries, the civil servants that allow and actively participate in deforestation, and sections of the citizenry that continue to use charcoal as cooking fuel. These harms exacerbate the effects of climate change, and Kano seems ready to sanction and penalise these behaviours with fines. This is an internal source of raising climate finance; however, the potential of this source needs to be clarified, and political costs may have to be paid to achieve the revenues. As it was said about Kaduna State, all hands would have to be on deck to raise the external climate finance needed in Kano State. This presents an opportunity to empower Civil Society Organisations (CSO), the State House of Assembly (SHA), the Organised Private Sector (OPS) and the Media (MED) to join Key Private Interests (KPIs) – the trusted advisers of the Governor, in presenting alternatives and linkages through which the State can raise the external climate finance it needs – it should also strengthen the moral right to get involved in tracking the utilisation of such funds. This would manoeuvre these stakeholders into a position where the Governor must reckon with them. To achieve this, the PACE Programme must provide extensive training, facilitation, research, and signposting.

Raising Public Awareness: Kano’s WECCMA and associated MDAs such as Agriculture, Environment, Environmental Protection, Energy, Water Resources, and Emergency Management, along with those needed in impact management, such as Local Government Affairs, Housing and urban development, Traditional and Religious Institutions, CSOs, Academics, and Citizen Groups, need to be made aware of the imperative of embarking on climate action.

Coordination of Climate Action: In the case of Kano State, two coordination needs to happen around two issues. 1.) Mitigation of harms being done by staff, industries and citizens that worsen the effects of climate change and 2.) specific cross-cutting actions that must be taken to manage climate change and its effects. Should the Governor see a clear pathway to external funds for climate actions and other stakeholders be well-trained, the rationale and mechanisms for coordination become relevant and vital tools. Where the different stakeholders are involved in the aggressive search for external climate finance, the case for their inclusion and legitimacy in coordinating implementation could be strengthened. Such effort should include the Governor’s trusted advisers (Key Private Interests).

5.5 Priorities and Opportunities for Intervention

Accessing Climate Finance: There is a potential renewable energy boom at play in Kano state. The private sector needs to understand the market system, and the government needs to understand the key incentives required to stimulate the boom. PACE should provide funds to develop a Market Analysis and Strategy document to properly define the Market System for renewable energy and highlight the missing supporting functions and pieces on the rules side needed to stimulate the value chain. Implementing this will lead to a private sector investment in renewable energy boom where sums more significant than the climate finance raised could be called into play. This should help the Governor and vital private interests see that there is a potentially bigger pie and that more value is to be shared by allowing the proper implementation and coordination of climate actions. Given an enabling state environment driven by business opportunities and state energy independence, the internally and externally accessed climate finance funds could be used effectively. This would be the argument for allowing the private sector and civil society organisations to get involved in attracting climate funds to Kano State.

Stimulating Public Awareness: As proposed at other levels, this should be conducted using the PACE grant funding mechanism at three levels.

- **Level 1:** Support for academics, civil society, the Organised Private Sector, and collaborators in the international and donor community to collate information on the nature and evidence of climate change impacts in Kano State possible solutions. It should also go over the harms being done by industry, staff of the MDAs and citizens if they don't change their behaviour. This will give PACE access to a pool of trained experts who can assist with the next level.
- **Level 2:** Grant support to civil society and other trained actors to help train citizen groups, beneficiary groups (like Farmers Associations), the State House of Assembly, MDAs, the Media, and traditional and religious institutions on the imperatives of climate change and the actions that must be taken. It should also include training on rights, obligations, processes, and procedures for engaging decision-makers.
- **Level 3:** Public-private policy dialogues with the Governors, his cabinet, Kano State WECCMA and associated MDAs, Key Private Interests, Civil Society, Academics and the Organised Private Sector.

Coordinating Climate Action: The entry point for making a case for coordination would be demonstrating the value that could be stimulated in the state where climate actions are well coordinated. This will come from a well-developed Market Analysis and Strategy for renewables as a cross-cutting market for watershed management, erosion control, agriculture, climate change, etc. This strategy will demonstrate to the private sector where the money is and the value of unserved or underserved markets. It will help the government understand how to unlock this value using the climate funds raised and serve as a blueprint for coordination across the whole government and society in Kano State.

6.0. State Level Analysis: Jigawa

Limited resources are allocated to coordinate the implementation of existing climate action initiatives and commitments in Jigawa State. This issue must become a priority for the state governor to gain the necessary support. Transforming the governor's 12-point agenda into a structured state development plan, along with constructive consultation and engagement from citizens and securing public support for re-election, could be beneficial. Consequently, advocacy for incentives to stimulate and accelerate investment in renewable energy projects and programs through public-private sector participation in the state may be effective.

6.1 Portrait of Current Challenges

Jigawa State is vulnerable to many of the same climate impacts as the rest of Northern Nigeria, which have been listed in the National Level Analysis. These include rising temperatures, drought, irregular rainfall, flooding, desertification, and biodiversity loss. These factors threaten agriculture, food security, public health, and economic stability, creating complex challenges that require robust adaptation and resilience-building strategies. Jigawa State, located in the semi-arid region of northern Nigeria, faces unique climate impacts shaped by its proximity to the Sahel and its predominantly agricultural economy. These vulnerabilities are driven by the state's geographic location, dependence on agriculture, and challenges related to water scarcity and desertification.

Jigawa State is particularly susceptible to the following climate impacts:

Desertification and Land Degradation: Jigawa State is in the Sahel zone, making it highly susceptible to desertification. Deforestation, overgrazing, and unsustainable farming practices increase soil erosion and land degradation. Encroaching desert sands diminish arable land, threatening agriculture and livelihoods.

Dual Vulnerability to Drought and Flooding: This issue arises from a semi-arid environment and river systems. Resource-based conflicts characterise the problem, stemming from competition for dwindling land and water resources and threats to crucial wetland ecosystems, such as the Hadejia-Nguru wetlands, which are vital for agriculture, fishing, and biodiversity.

Prolonged Dry Spells and Drought: Due to its semi-arid climate, the state experiences recurring dry spells. Drought conditions reduce water availability for farming, domestic use, and livestock, intensifying resource competition. These impacts severely affect food security and worsen rural poverty.

Flooding in Low-Lying Areas: While drought is a major concern, Jigawa is also prone to seasonal flooding, particularly along the Hadejia River Basin. Flooding occurs due to heavy rainfall, poor drainage systems, and overflow from upstream dams, damaging homes, farmlands, and infrastructure. Flash floods disrupt local economies, displacing communities and increasing vulnerability to waterborne diseases.

Declining Water Resources: Rivers and water bodies like the Hadejia-Nguru wetlands are generally drying up due to reduced annual rainfall and unsustainable water management practices. Overreliance on these wetlands for farming and fishing stresses already fragile ecosystems. Shrinking water resources impact irrigation, livestock, and biodiversity, which are central to Jigawa's economy.

Impacts on Agriculture: Jigawa's primarily agricultural economy is vulnerable to climate variability. Unpredictable rainfall impacts staple crops like millet, sorghum, and groundnuts, leading to declining yields. Pest outbreaks, such as locusts and armyworms, thrive in warmer conditions and significantly damage crops. Limited grazing lands and water shortages also challenge livestock farming, affecting the livelihoods of pastoral communities.

Heatwaves and Rising Temperatures: Rising temperatures in Jigawa are increasing the frequency and intensity of heatwaves, which can lead to heat-related illnesses and reduced agricultural productivity. Extreme heat also accelerates water evaporation, further worsening water scarcity.

Impact on Livelihoods and Rural-Urban Migration: The combination of desertification, drought, and declining agricultural productivity forces many residents to migrate to urban centres or neighbouring

states for alternative livelihoods. This migration strains urban areas and creates socio-economic challenges for rural and urban communities.

Loss of Biodiversity: The degradation of natural habitats, particularly the Hadejia-Nguru wetlands, has led to declining biodiversity. This affects wildlife and fish populations, which are essential for ecological balance. Habitat loss and overexploitation also threaten local livelihoods.

6.2 Policy Responses & Climate Action

Policy and Institutional Framework: Jigawa State has yet to develop a comprehensive, standalone climate change policy, though it aligns with national policies like Nigeria's National Adaptation Strategy and Plan of Action on Climate Change (NASPA-CCN). Existing policies focus broadly on environmental protection, desertification control, and water management. The state's Ministry of Environment oversees climate and ecological initiatives, though it faces resource and capacity limitations that can hinder effective climate action and adaptation planning.

Desertification and Land Restoration Initiatives: Jigawa is part of the *Great Green Wall* initiative to restore degraded lands and reduce desert encroachment across northern Nigeria. The state engages in tree-planting campaigns to slow desertification and improve soil quality, although these efforts are limited due to inconsistent funding and a high demand for arable land. The state encourages soil conservation practices, such as erosion control and water retention techniques. However, access to the training and resources needed to implement these practices effectively across all affected areas is limited, particularly in rural communities.

Water Resource Management and Flood Control: Jigawa experiences seasonal flooding during Nigeria's rainy season, affecting low-lying areas and agricultural lands. The state has invested in flood management infrastructure, including drainage systems and levees, but these systems often fall short due to limited maintenance and insufficient funds. With scarce water sources outside the rainy season, Jigawa faces challenges in meeting water needs for both agricultural and domestic use. The state has invested in sustainable water management practices, such as improved irrigation systems and rainwater harvesting; however, resource constraints and lack of technical expertise limit these initiatives.

In 2019, the state developed a WASH Policy in collaboration with UNICEF. They plan to review and update it, especially considering the significant challenges of climate change, such as flooding and delayed rains, which affect the provision of clean water and sanitation. Borehole drilling activities by the private sector have significantly affected water quality and quantity, depleting water table levels across the state. Some levels are now as low as 150 meters. The same applies to traditional and household wells that are drying up. This situation is further compounded by the ongoing drought and desert encroachment rapidly approaching from the neighbouring Niger Republic.

The Ministry is planning to review existing water policies and laws, especially the proposed Water Law. This review aims to regulate water supply, consumption, and waste disposal management. The law is currently with the State House of Assembly, but lawmakers are not favourably disposed to reviewing water fees for fear of a political backlash from citizens. The Ministry promotes solar pumps through its water schemes, particularly for public use among farmers in Fadama areas. It uses funds from the ACRReSAL program to remove water hyacinths and other blockages from the waterways.

Climate-Resilient Agriculture: Given Jigawa's reliance on agriculture, the state promotes drought-resistant crop varieties and conservation agriculture techniques. However, many farmers lack access to climate-resilient seeds and sustainable farming methods due to limited outreach programs. Extension services support climate-resilient practices such as soil management and crop rotation. The Jigawa State Agricultural Development Agency (JADA) has recruited 1,435 extension workers, in addition to its current 285 trained and equipped employees who are provided with motorcycles for transportation to promote climate-smart agricultural practices across the state. Yet, these services are often under-resourced, limiting their reach, especially for smallholder farmers in remote areas. The state helps in the form of fertilizers, chemicals, and early-maturity seeds like watermelon, cowpea, rice, and maize to farmers affected by floods through its Flood Residual Moisture Cropping Program. They have also initiated farming

that relies on boreholes in rural areas, launching pilots in three LGAs and promoting local production and application of organic fertilizer.

Disaster Preparedness and Early Warning Systems: Jigawa's disaster preparedness efforts include early warning systems for floods, but the reach and effectiveness of these systems are limited. Most alerts and preparedness measures do not reach remote rural communities in a timely manner, which limits their utility for farmers and vulnerable populations. The state has some community-focused programs to raise awareness about climate risks and improve resilience, but these efforts are often sporadic and rely on partnerships with NGOs, highlighting the need for greater state-level investment.

Renewable Energy Initiatives: Jigawa has explored solar energy as an alternative power source to address energy gaps, particularly in rural areas. Pilot solar projects and solar installations in health centres and schools are steps toward more sustainable energy use. However, scaling up renewable energy in the state remains limited due to high costs and inadequate technical support. Despite some investment in renewable energy, Jigawa faces persistent energy access challenges, particularly in rural areas where many communities still need more reliable electricity, which affects both development and resilience. In 2001, the state established the Alternative Energy Agency under the Ministry of Environment, which has now been moved to the Ministry of Power and Energy. It also established an Alternative Energy Fund, which is yet to be backed by an Alternative Energy Law or Policy. Major activities/achievements of the new ministry and its agencies include:

- Solar power has been used for lighting, including streetlights in 30 villages, SMEs, clinics, refrigeration units, homes, and more.
- The Alternative Energy Agency has produced over 100,000 clean, energy-saving cook stoves in the last 10 years.
- Local communities are trained in briquette production, especially using Typha grass, which causes harm to rivers.

Public Awareness and Community Engagement: Public awareness of climate change is growing slowly, though significant knowledge gaps still need to be addressed. Awareness campaigns and community education efforts have primarily been led by NGOs, with limited direct involvement from state agencies due to budget and personnel constraints. Local organisations and youth groups are increasingly involved in environmental and climate initiatives, but they often lack the funding and institutional support needed for long-term impact.

6.3 Effectiveness of Current Arrangements

Jigawa State has taken preliminary steps to address climate change risks, but significant gaps remain. Funding and technical limitations hinder preparedness. Despite promising initiatives in afforestation and flood control, the scale and effectiveness of these efforts are often insufficient for widespread impact. For Jigawa to enhance its climate change resilience, increased investment, capacity building, and stronger partnerships with NGOs and international agencies will be essential. Addressing these gaps will enable Jigawa to better support its vulnerable communities and manage its various climate challenges.

What follows is a breakdown of the primary drivers shaping the political economy of climate change preparedness in Jigawa:

Governance and Institutional Capacity: Jigawa has limited institutional capacity and resources for climate change adaptation. The state government's agencies, including those focused on agriculture, water resources, and the environment, often struggle with coordination and funding constraints, limiting their effectiveness in climate preparedness. While there is some awareness of climate challenges among political leaders, it remains insufficient across all segments of society in Jigawa State. Commitment to addressing climate change issues needs to be demonstrated through the establishment of a central coordinating mechanism, which is currently lacking. MDAs that deal with climate change issues still operate in silos and prioritize turf protection. No climate change tracking is being conducted at the local government level.

Federal Support and Dependency: Jigawa depends significantly on federal allocations for funding and resources, including climate adaptation efforts. This reliance on federal support limits the state's financial autonomy and restricts its ability to implement locally tailored climate initiatives. While Jigawa follows Nigeria's broader climate adaptation strategies and policies, localized climate impacts necessitate targeted interventions.

Funding Gaps and Resource Constraints: As mentioned above, Jigawa's budget is limited. Climate adaptation projects often compete with other pressing needs, such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure. Even when climate funding is available, it is usually designated for specific projects, which reduces flexibility and limits comprehensive adaptation planning. Jigawa's climate initiatives often depend on international aid and development programs from donors and NGOs. While helpful, this dependency can create sustainability issues, as projects may not continue once external funding ends. As seen at the federal level and in other states, when significant funds are made available for climate change activities, executive leadership takes over implementing such projects from the Ministry to capture as much value as possible.

Economic Dependence on Agriculture and Vulnerability to Climate: Jigawa's economy relies heavily on agriculture, with a large portion of its population engaged in farming activities such as millet, sorghum, and rice cultivation. This sector is highly sensitive to climate variability, including droughts and erratic rainfall, which can severely impact food security and rural livelihoods. Climate-smart agriculture and proper water management are critical for resilience; however, many farmers in Jigawa lack access to resources like drought-resistant seeds, irrigation, and extension services. Limited infrastructure and funding further restrict the state's ability to support climate-resilient farming practices.

Public Awareness and Community Engagement: Most residents of Jigawa need to be more aware of climate change and its impacts. This hinders community engagement and adaptive behaviours. The biggest challenge is that government staff, public officials, and politicians also have a minimal understanding of climate change issues despite the practical realities. Alarmed by this situation, the Ministry of Education and some traditional rulers are taking some action.

The AGILE Programme: The programme has incorporated Climate Change awareness information into all its activities as well as greening its budget and funding. Some Climate Change activities include:


- a) Tree planting.
- b) Young farmers' clubs in schools.
- c) WASH in schools to address open defecation.
- d) Training and awareness creation on Climate Change issues and their impact on schools and communities, especially for School Based Management Boards.
- e) Carrying out Environmental and Social Impact Assessments as a major part of the procurement process.

Efforts by Traditional Rulers: Floods present a significant challenge in the state, especially in rural and farming communities. They impact trade, the economy, and livelihoods. Traditional rulers recognize their role in tackling this aspect of climate change.

- The Emir of Dutse has appointed a very senior emirate chief and council member as the councillor in charge of environment and climate change.
- They work to identify, and report cracked embankments and fish-trapping holes that cause flooding. They also help supervise the Ministry of Environment's repairs and maintenance of embankments.
- They supervise local tree planting, including the propagation of tree seeds. The late Emir of Dutse, Alhaji Sanusi, personally produced and led this seed propagation.

This is creating awareness and education about climate change.

6.4 Mapping of Key Actors/Stakeholders and Motivations



See Annexe 4 for details and stakeholder index – note: the colours assigned to different stakeholders indicate a common level of power, interest and potential for cooperation/threat (coalition potential?).

Accessing Climate Finance: As it was said of Kaduna and Kano States, all hands would have to be on deck to close the funding gap in Jigawa State, particularly through raising climate finance. This presents an opportunity to empower Traditional and Religious Institutions (TRI) through plans like the Emir of Dutse already has in place. Traditional Civil Society Organisations (CSO) is weak to non-existent in Jigawa State so the work of the Emir of Dutse in appointing a very senior emirate chief and council member as the councillor in charge of environment and climate change is worthy of note. The State House of Assembly (SHA), the Organised Private Sector (OPS) and the Media (MED) need also to join Key Private Interests (KPIs) – the trusted advisers of the Governor, in presenting alternatives and linkages through which the State can close its funding gaps particularly around climate finance – this should also strengthen the moral right to get involved in tracking the utilisation of such funds. This would manoeuvre these stakeholders into a position where the Governor must reckon with them. To achieve this, the PACE Programme must provide extensive training, facilitation, research, and signposting.

Raising Public Awareness: Jigawa State WECCMA Agencies and associated MDAs such as Agriculture, Environment, Environmental Protection, Energy, Water Resources, and Emergency Management, along with those needed in impact management, such as Local Government Affairs, Housing and urban development, Traditional and Religious Institutions, CSOs, Academics, and Citizen Groups, need to be made aware of the imperative of embarking on climate action.

Coordination of Climate Action: In the case of Jigawa State, two types of coordination need to happen. 1.) Support needs to be provided to the Emirate Council and the Religious Institutions in Jigawa State around how best to intervene on the issue of climate change and how to coordinate their interventions and 2.) the specific cross-cutting actions that must be taken to manage climate change and its effects, generally. Should the Governor see a clear pathway to close funding gaps for climate actions and other stakeholders be well-trained, the rationale and mechanisms for coordination become relevant and vital tools. Where the different stakeholders are involved in the effort to close funding gaps in the state such as through climate finance, the case for their inclusion and legitimacy in coordinating implementation could be strengthened. Such effort should include the Governor's trusted advisers (key Private Interests).

6.5 Priorities and Opportunities for Intervention

Closing the Funding Gap: There is a potential renewable energy boom at play in Jigawa state. The private sector needs to understand the market system, and the government needs to understand the key incentives required to stimulate the boom. PACE should provide funds to develop a Market Analysis and Strategy document to properly define the Market System for renewable energy and highlight the missing supporting functions and pieces on the rules side needed to stimulate the value chain. Implementing this will lead to a private sector investment in renewable energy boom where sums more significant than the climate finance raised could be called into play. This should help the Governor, and vital private interests see that there is a bigger pie and that more value is to be shared by allowing the proper implementation and coordination of climate actions. Given an enabling state environment driven by business opportunities and state energy independence, the climate funds could be used effectively. This would be the argument for allowing the private sector and people's representatives, such as the Emirate Council and Religious Institutions, to get involved in attracting climate funds to Jigawa State.

Stimulating Public Awareness: As proposed at other locations, this should be conducted using the PACE grant funding mechanism at three levels.

- **Level 1:** Support for academics, religious and traditional institutions, the Organised Private Sector, and collaborators in the international and donor community to collate information on the nature and evidence of climate change impacts in Jigawa State possible solutions. This will give PACE access to a pool of trained experts who can assist with the next level.
- **Level 2:** Grant support to consultants from academia and other trained actors to help train citizen groups, beneficiary groups (like Farmers Associations), the State House of Assembly, MDAs, the Media, and traditional and religious institutions on the imperatives of climate change and the actions that must be taken. It should also include training on rights, obligations, processes, and procedures for engaging decision-makers.
- **Level 3:** Public-private policy dialogues with the Governors, his cabinet, Jigawa State WECCMA Agencies and other service delivery MDAs, Key Private Interests, Traditional and Religious Institutions, Academics and the Organised Private Sector.

Coordinating Climate Action: The entry point for making a case for coordination would be demonstrating the value that could be stimulated in the state where climate actions are well coordinated. This will come from a well-developed Market Analysis and Strategy for renewables as a cross-cutting market for watershed management, erosion control, agriculture, climate change, etc. This strategy will demonstrate to the private sector and key private interests where the money is and the value of unserved or under-served markets. It will help the government understand how to unlock this value using the climate funds raised and serve as a blueprint for coordination across the whole government and society in Jigawa State.

7.0. Most Promising Entry Points and Issues

Development partners working on interrelated governance and climate change challenges over the past 20 years (like ICEED) have learnt that **changes in attitude and behaviour** within government, the private sector, and among the public, happen when individuals see and feel the **economic benefit** of that change: in the health of their budget (resources), their profit margins, their personal income or their household economy. **Entry points and issues** (i.e. tangible problems with political traction and feasible solutions) with the potential to mobilise and drive collective action across the ‘whole of society’ on these three key priorities – accessing climate finance, stimulating public awareness and coordinating climate action – will need to be linked to **economic incentives** in line with the current governance and climate challenges, arrangements, actions and motivations of stakeholders in each location, presented in the Sections above.

On this premise, accessing climate finance – private sector finance in particular, for greater impact and sustainability, rather than just government or donor/international finance – takes on the highest order of priority, while awareness is being raised and coordination strengthened. Without climate finance, neither of the latter priorities will result in effective action and could deepen the current inertia on climate action if early efforts and momentum don’t yield results for lack of resources. This is not to say that stimulating public awareness and coordination of climate action should await access to climate finance and cannot serve as further stimulation for this – all three priorities are mutually reinforcing and should be synergised.

Selection of the most promising entry points and issues for programme engagement on these priorities will also draw on criteria identified through PACE’s initial climate risk, conflict risk and gender, disability and social inclusion analyses (TORs 6, 11, 12). When combined with criteria from this PEA, they provide a 4-dimensional selection filter to narrow down the wide range of possibilities in each location. Any entry point or issue that meets the criteria from all four angles is more likely to offer the greatest potential to achieve the programme’s multiple objectives and should be given high priority in programme planning.

7.1 National Level Entry Points for Intervention

Section 3 above outlines an engagement strategy for each priority, through **key actors and institutions** with different levels of interest, power and potential for cooperation and/or threat, and **key issues** linked with economic benefits/incentives that can push stakeholders to build the necessary momentum for change, hold the President's attention, address rising energy costs and provide alternative energy solutions, in ways that are both more accountable and inclusive:

Priority	Key actors and institutions	Key issues
Accessing climate finance	Target Key Private Interests (like Oando Plc) with experience in accessing international climate finance to provide a pathway to increase the interest of the Presidency, Vice Presidency and Nigerian Governors Forum, together with that of the key public finance institutions (Central Bank of Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Budget & Economic Planning) and National Council on Climate Change (NCCC) in taking urgent climate action	• Energy transition • Switching to gas • Fuel subsidy removal • Cost-of-living crisis • The polluter pays • Food crisis (sustainable energy supply for farming)
Stimulating public awareness	Empower the Academia, Organised Private Sector, CSOs, and Donors/Development Partners to influence public understanding of Citizens and Farmers Groups, the NASS, Media, Traditional/Religious Institutions on climate impacts and possible solutions, to increase the interest of the Presidency, Vice Presidency, Nigerian Governors Forum, key public finance institutions and NCCC in taking action	As above, plus • Deforestation (for fuel) • Seasonal flooding • Food crisis (hunger) • Security crisis • Power supply (household, industry and agriculture) (all inter-related)
Coordinating climate action	Harness the momentum of actions on the above priorities to incentivise an increase the level of cooperation among the Federal MDAs, Nigerian Governors Forum, Presidency, Vice Presidency and key public finance institutions in support of	As above, plus • International standing (COP-related credibility and credit worthiness)?

	the NCCC, capitalising on their ‘fear of losing out’ on the economic benefits of accessing climate finance	
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The PACE Federal delivery team will need to identify and test **viable entry points** for such engagement during early implementation through existing and new relationships with these key actors and institutions. These will likely build on PERL’s legacy, consortium partners’ connections, new opportunities, and some pro-active outreach. At present, PACE’s intervention strategy and workplans at the national level appear limited, to building on legacy relations with the National OGP Secretariat and Federal MDA Performance Delivery Unit, and with ICEED and Bridge That Gap’s relationships with Federal MDAs and NGO/CSOs in the Environment sector. Potential in-roads to the Presidency, Vice Presidency, Nigerian Governors Forum, Key Public Finance Institutions, Key Private Interests, Organised Private Sector and Academia, with greater focus on the Energy sector, are less apparent at this stage. Leading thinktanks like the Nigerian Climate Change Forum (NCCF, <https://nigeriaclimatechangeforum.com/>) chaired by the Director General & Chief Executive of the Energy Commission of Nigeria, and the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG, <https://www.nesgroup.org/>) might provide such in-roads.

Once PACE’s broad national level intervention strategy is more clearly defined, more in-depth PE analysis of each area of intervention will be required, together with tracking tools, to inform further development and iterative adaptation of the strategy and planned activities. This will highlight **perceived risks** or threats (i.e. likely pitfalls, blockers, capture, opposition, etc) as well as new opportunities.

Through early engagement the team will also learn **which issues** generate the most interest, have political traction and drive climate action. This may change with time, as action progresses on each priority, with new actors and institutions coming on board changing the dynamic and the narrative, and with changes in the national context, shifting the focus of public attention to certain issues.

7.2 State Level Entry Points for Intervention in Kaduna, Kano and Jigawa

Viable entry points and tangible issues will need to be found for such engagement in each of PACE’s focal NW states, in line with the political interests, opportunities and challenges of each location:

- that can address the debt burden in **Kaduna** by helping IGR to reach sustainable levels, and initially support climate initiatives that are not capital-intensive or require long-term investment
- that can persuade the government in **Kano** to incentivise companies to engage in climate actions and support flow of external and private sector finance for implementation of the new climate change policy, to overcome the current inertia
- that can become a priority for the **Jigawa** state governor (to drive state climate policy implementation) and provide incentives to stimulate and accelerate investment in renewable energy projects and programs, etc, through public-private sector participation.

Priority	Key actors and institutions	Key issues
Accessing climate finance	Kaduna: Empower CSOs, SHoA, Organised Private Sector and Media to join Key Private Interests (trusted advisers of the Governor) to present funding alternatives and pathways, with the moral right then to track utilisation of such funds	• Potential renewable energy boom in the state (private sector and IGR growth) • State energy independence
	Kano: As above for Kaduna	As above for Kaduna, plus • Food crisis (sustainable energy supply for farming)
	Jigawa: As above for Kaduna, but with Traditional/Religious Institutions like the Emir of Dutse leading, rather than CSOs	As above for Kano, plus • Afforestation (linked to desertification control) • Seasonal flooding (control and disaster preparedness)
	Kaduna: Support the Academia, Organised Private Sector, CSOs, and Donors/Development Partners to influence	• Fuel subsidy removal • Cost-of-living crisis

Stimulating public awareness	public understanding of Citizens and Farmers Groups, the SHoA, MDAs, Media, Traditional/Religious Institutions on climate impacts and imperatives, to engage the Governor, ExCo, State WECCMA in public-private policy dialogue	• Food crisis (hunger) • Growing security crisis • Deforestation (for fuel, including charcoal burning) • Seasonal flooding (all inter-related)
	Kano: As above for Kaduna	As above for Kaduna, plus • Power supply (household, industry and agriculture)
	Jigawa: As above for Kaduna, but with involvement of the Traditional/Religious Institutions from the outset	As above for Kano, plus • Afforestation (linked to desertification control) • Seasonal human migration (herder-farmer conflicts)
Coordinating climate action	Kaduna: Harness the funding pathways, public awareness and the Governor's trusted advisors (Key Private Interests) to strengthen coordination mechanisms, and support them (state WECCMA, MDAs, SHoA, etc) demonstrate the value stimulated where climate actions are well coordinated	As further above for Kaduna on both priorities, plus ... • Deforestation (by forest guards/civil servants)
	Kano: As above for Kaduna, with additional measures to mitigate climate-harmful practices by industries, civil servants and citizens, and facilitate specific cross-cutting actions to manage climate change and its effects	As further above for Kano on both priorities, plus ... • Air quality / environmental pollution (by industries) • Deforestation (by forest guards/civil servants)
	Jigawa: As above for Kaduna, with greater attention to the role of the Emirate Councils and Religious Institutions and coordination of their interventions, and specific cross-cutting actions to manage climate change and its effects	As further above for Jigawa on both priorities

These too will need to be put to the test during early implementation by PACE's State delivery teams, informing their intervention strategies and workplans, with the benefit of additional in-depth PE and risk analysis, and subsequent tracking, reflective learning and adaptation.

At present, PACE's intervention strategies and workplans in all three locations rely on entry points to work mainly with government MDAs, based on current state development plans, commitments (including the MAF with FCDO in Kaduna) and relationships (established during PERL), to build the capacity of relevant government agencies (WECCMAs in Kaduna and Kano) and develop state climate policies (in Jigawa). Pathways for 'Green Revenue Generation' to strengthen IGR are being explored in all three states, but again, primarily with government partners. These entry points need to be expanded to engage other key actors and institutions across the 'whole of society' and aligned with the politically smart engagement strategy broadly outlined above (in the table and preceding Sections) against the three key priorities.

7.3 Cross-State / Regional Entry Points for Intervention (Horizontal Linkages)

All three key priorities lend themselves to a degree of cross-state/regional collaboration and mutual reinforcement. Regional collaboration on **stimulating public awareness** makes good sense, through cross-state collation of information on the nature and evidence of climate change impacts, pooling trained experts and training of citizen groups, beneficiary groups, the legislature, MDAs, the Media, and traditional and religious institutions – with some slight differences in the composition of leading actors and institutions in each state. The majority of tangible climate impacts (key issues) affecting these states are common to all three, even though the nature or extent of their impact may differ somewhat (with their geographical and demographic differences).

Current arrangements for **coordinating climate action** are more clearly defined in Kano than in Kaduna and Jigawa, though private sector inclusion has been neglected in developing and implementing Kano's climate policies and actions. The current political and governmental dynamics of each state also differ.

This merits each state developing its own mechanisms independently of each other, finding their own ways to harness and align the power blocks and interests in each state for successful implementation of their own climate actions and achievement of their own climate goals. This does not negate the possibility of supporting cross-state peer learning, to stimulate cross-state peer competition, to incentivise improvements and spur momentum for change, particularly where some are demonstrating their value (especially in terms of climate finance gained) where climate actions are well coordinated.

Likewise, facilitating cross-state peer learning, stimulating cross-state peer competition, may be a more effective strategy than supporting cross-state collaboration on **accessing climate finance**. Managing the different political interests and economic incentives in each state is likely to require a location specific focus of support, though there may be times when regional collaboration with other states is required to access funds (e.g. for inter-state river basin management to control seasonal flooding). Where cross-state collaboration between KKJ states on **climate finance** may be needed, is in mutually reinforcing the moral right and technical strategies of CSOs, SHoA, Organised Private Sector and Media to track utilisation of such funds. Such collaboration might need to extent to national level engagement, to work with state and non-state organisations with the technical capacity or mandate to track such funds.

7.4 Entry Points Requiring Aligned National-State Intervention (Vertical Linkages)

Tracking climate finance accessed through national and international funding pathways is a prime example of a space where PACE could add value through ‘vertical alignment’ of its interventions at the Federal level with those in one or more of the focal states – and with support to other states in other regions through PACE’s ‘help desk’ facility. Likewise, **stimulating public awareness** through collation of information on the nature and evidence of climate change impacts, pooling trained experts and training, may require the engagement of key actors and institutions outside of KKJ states, at the national level or in other regions. PACE has the potential to facilitate such linkages, smartly and strategically.

Although the mechanisms for **coordinating climate action** at the national level are currently ineffective, improvements or developments at this level may have an impact on state level coordination mechanisms – e.g. through national policy changes pertaining to the role of the Ministry of Environment, or State Assemblies, or Nigerian Governors Forum. Here, collaboration between the PACE Federal and State teams may be needed to consider the implications and PACE’s response in support of state level partners.

PACE has been designed to provide technical support to focal states to **access climate finance** from external sources, as well as generate it domestically. Linking national and state actors and institutions working in the financial sector (in Lagos as well as Abuja) to achieve both objectives will be required at times, necessitating collaborative working between the PACE Federal and State teams and key partners. This also includes national and international actors and institutions involved in data generation to address the absence of ground data pertaining to climate elements that affect planning for effective response at all levels. Access to climate finance frequently requires location disaggregated baselines and evidence of systems in place for measuring changes in carbon emissions, to qualify for funding. Presently there is limited capacity at the national level to provide this, limiting Nigeria’s access to climate finance.

7.5 Cross-Cutting Entry Points for Promoting Gender, Disability & Social Inclusion

PACE seeks to ensure that women, the disabled, and other socially excluded groups in focal states are not only better protected from the adverse effects of climate change but also empowered to contribute to and benefit from climate actions. It is designed to take an **inclusive and participatory approach** across the whole programme. Within the politically smart engagement strategy broadly outlined above there are ample opportunities to facilitate this, in relation to each priority:

- **accessing climate finance:** through the selection of CSOs, SHoA, Organised Private Sector and the Media (organisations and representatives) who engage Key Private Interests in each state to present funding alternatives and pathways ... and through prioritising funds that require social inclusion and accountability mechanisms to be in place, with proactive measures and targeted financial support to women, the disabled, and other socially excluded groups.

- **stimulating public awareness:** through the selection of Academics, Organised Private Sector, CSOs, and Donors/Development Partners brought together to influence public understanding, the nature of the information they collate on climate change impacts, and the selection of citizens and farmers groups they initially train ... and through the programme's role in facilitating 'inclusive' public-private policy dialogues with political leaders and key public finance institutions.
- **coordinating climate action:** through PACE's role in strengthening coordination mechanisms at each level, advocating and facilitating them to be more inclusive and accountable.

Across each of these priorities, PACE is well placed to shape the narrative of issues engaging these actors and institutions in climate action, highlighting gender, disability and social inclusion perspectives, as well as conflict considerations, to proactively alleviate or mitigate social conflicts and political divisions.

8.0. Possible Entry Points for Wider Intervention by FCDO

8.1 For UK Trade & Investment

From analysis of Sections 3-6 above, in discussion with PACE Federal/National team and FCDO, cross-referenced with Climate and Conflict study findings ... including a very provisional (surface level – to be explored in more depth during the first year of implementation) risk analysis. Note: FCDO Nigeria have expressed a strong interest in gaining insight on this from the PEA.

8.2 For Portfolio Coordination

From analysis of Sections 3-6 above, in discussion with PACE Federal/National team and FCDO, cross-referenced with Climate and Conflict study findings. Agric>P+, Health>Lafiya, WR>??? PACE central role within portfolio is enabling 'policy' and 'revenue/PFM' focussed, rather than sector specific interventions?

Implications of LG Autonomy for Revenue/PFM, impact on sectors: Agric (Propcom+), Education (PLANE), Health (Lafiya) ... and Security (SPRING)? ... all being asked to do their own PEA of the implications for their sectors – PACE can play a central alignment role in relation to revenue/PFM

8.3 For Social Protection

From analysis of Sections 3-6 above, in discussion with PACE Federal/National team and FCDO, cross-referenced with Climate, Conflict and GDSI study findings.

... This section will be completed next week, following discussions with the Delivery Teams during the work planning sessions, based on their review on Sections 3-6 above.

9.0. Operational Implications & Options

9.1 Broad Prognosis: Does this Initial PEA Confirm the Programme's Design?

i.e. across NGCP locations, what are the most plausible pathways of change towards a more inclusive and sustainable political settlement/social contract? What changes need to occur to shift political incentives towards more accountable and climate conscious governance? Who are the key actors driving these pathways? What might the intermediate steps on the pathway of change look like? Is this programme on the right path? <<< this Inception PEA should provide some initial thoughts on these questions, as a baseline for exploration and learning throughout implementation.

9.2 Critical Assumptions, Opportunities and Risks

From everything above, **cross-referenced with the Climate, Conflict and GESI study findings.**

(here or in section 7?) PACE's engagement in each of these three priority areas presents **risks** as well as opportunities: risks that programme interventions merely reinforce the **status quo** (elite capture, resource diversion, waste and corruption, contributing further to the current economic and security crisis in the country) instead of changing the current **political settlement** (for a more accountable, inclusive, responsive and transparent government, leading to a more stable and climate-resilient Nigeria). ... **as a 4th generation governance programme, pace will have achieved nothing if its interventions do not influence positive changes in the political SETTLEMENT**

9.3 Implications for PACE's Theory of Change & Results Framework

From everything above, **cross-referenced with the ToC/RF development findings/proposal.**

9.4 Implications for Funding Strategic Opportunities & Issue Based Coalitions

i.e. given the PEA findings, how should PACE structure its grants programme, including the Special Opportunities Fund? <<< review the relevant sections of DAI's Technical Proposal for NGCP and initial drafts of NGCP's Approach to Managing SOF (TOR8) and Criteria and Method Approved for Identification and Selection of Issues Based-Projects (TOR9) in view of the general findings of this PEA and advise accordingly. ... **NB. The NGCP core team does not expect interventions and issues to be agreed/selected by the end of inception – only that the criteria and method of their selection be developed.**

9.5 Implications for Programme Risk Management, including 'Do No Harm'

i.e. are there specific policy areas where significant harm is likely to be happening to either mitigation or resilience outcomes, to which PACE could help to de-risk or more constructively direct? This is also highly likely given the mix of ideas which influence state-level policy, some of which can be outdated or ill-informed. <<< review relevant sections of DAI's Technical Proposal for NGCP and initial drafts of NGCP's Conflict Sensitivity Analysis (TOR12) in view of the general findings of this PEA, and advise accordingly.

9.6 Implications for Team Composition, Capacity and Ways of Working

i.e. how could the delivery teams in the locations think and work politically more effectively? <<< summarise from the findings of the PMEL PERL study and PERL PCR recommendations, and any other concerns arising from this PEA, and in relation to taking a 'whole of society' approach – **prioritisation of any focal sector, or gaps in relation to engaging any critical segment of society ... that can be addressed in the process of recruitment for implementation, and TWP mentoring support from Integrity & TPP. ... private sector engagement, market systems analysis, energy sector**

9.7 Next Steps: Deepening the Analysis on Promising Entry Points

i.e. are there critical knowledge and awareness or engagement gaps, and if so, in regard to what? <<< make the case for this inception PEA being a surface-scratching 'macro' PEA (given the severely limited TA days/resources available at this stage) ... surfacing possible intervention areas, aimed at systemic

reforms (component 2), or issues through which NGCP might support coalitions (component 1) ... which will each (if, as and when required, depending on their prioritisation by the NGCP team based on multiple perspectives) require deeper dive, exploratory engagement to analysis their 'micro' political economies (and assess their tangibility, tractability and feasibility) during early implementation.

... This section will be completed next week, following discussions with the Management Team, following the work planning sessions, based on their review on sections 1-8 above.

Annexe 1: National Level Analysis – Details

National Level Stakeholder Identification

Issue: Readiness to implement climate actions


	STAKEHOLDER GROUP	GENERIC INCENTIVES	P	I	T	C
1.	The President of the FRN (PRE)	International Climate Finance; Elite Capture of Value	H	L	M	M
2.	The Vice-President (VPR)	International Climate Finance; Elite Capture of Value	H	L	M	M
3.	National Council on Climate Change (NCC)	Budgetary Allocations; improved security; attribution; International Climate Finance; Safeguard Livelihoods; Economic Survival; Business Growth; Capture of Value	H	M	M	H
4.	Donors & Development Partners (DDP)	International Climate Finance; Stop unplanned migration; reduce harsh conditions of living in Nigeria	M	H	L	H
5.	Federal Ministry of Environment (FME)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
6.	Federal Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development (FMA)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
7.	Federal Ministry of Livestock Development (FML)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
8.	Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR)	Maintain the status quo and preserve fossil fuels	H	H	H	M
9.	Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning (BEP)	Find new sources of funding for climate actions; International Climate Finance	H	M	M	M
10.	Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF)	Find new sources of funding for climate actions; International Climate Finance	H	M	M	M
11.	Ministry of Power (MOP)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
12.	Energy Commission of Nigeria (ECN)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
13.	Nigeria National Petroleum Company Limited (NPC)	Maintain the status quo and preserve fossil fuels	H	H	H	M
14.	Ministry of Women Affairs (MWA)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
15.	Ministry of Transportation (MOT)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
16.	Ministry of Water Resources (MOW)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
17.	The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)	International Climate Finance	H	M	M	M
18.	Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA)	Budgetary Allocations; improved security; attribution	H	H	M	L
19.	Nigeria Governors' Forum (NGF)	International Climate Finance	H	M	M	M
20.	Organised Private Sector (OPS)	Better investment climate and opportunities; access to capital	M	H	L	H
21.	Key Private Interests (KPI) – Business and other Elites with strong connections in the corridors of power.	Better investment climate and opportunities; access to capital; Elite Capture of Value	H	H	H	H
22.	Civil Society (CSO)	Donor Funding; Prominence; Leverage and Impact	M	H	L	H
23.	Media (MED)	Curiosity; Leverage; prominence of their platform; prestige; recognition; revenues	M	M	L	H
24.	Academia (ACD)	Scholarship; respect and recognition; acknowledgement; prosperity	L	H	L	H
25.	Traditional & Religious Institutions (TRI)	Improved security; attribution; elite capture of value	M	L	L	H
26.	National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (NRA)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
27.	Nigeria Meteorological Agency NiMET (NiM)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H

	STAKEHOLDER GROUP	GENERIC INCENTIVES	P	I	T	C
28.	All Farmers Association of Nigeria (FAN)	Safeguard Livelihoods; Economic Survival; Business Growth; Capture of Value	L	L	L	H
29.	Federal Ministry of Information (MOI)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
30.	Citizens (CTZ)	Escape from the harsh conditions of living in Nigeria	L	L	L	H
31.	National Assembly (NAS) – Relevant committees of the Upper and Lower Houses	Access to funds; prominence and power	M	M	L	M


Index: P=Power; I=Interest; T=Potential for Threat; C=Potential for Cooperation

National Level Stakeholder Maps

Power vs. Interest



Potential for Threat vs. Potential for Cooperation



Annexe 2: Kaduna State Level Analysis – Details


State Level Stakeholder Identification: Kaduna

Issue: Readiness to implement climate actions


	STAKEHOLDER GROUP	GENERIC INCENTIVES	P	I	T	C
1.	State Governor (GOV)	Climate Finance; Elite Capture of Value	H	M	M	M
2.	Ministry of Environment & Natural Resources (ENR)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
3.	Ministry of Justice (MOJ)	Water-tight agreements; turf protection	M	L	L	H
4.	State House of Assembly (SHA)	Access to funds; prominence and power	M	M	L	H
5.	Ministry of Water Resources (MWR)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
6.	Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
7.	Donors & Development Partners (DDP)	International Climate Finance; Stop unplanned migration; reduce harsh conditions of living in Nigeria	M	M	L	H
8.	Secretary to the State Government (SSG)	To satisfy the governor; Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	L	L	H
9.	State Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
10.	Ministry of Local Government Affairs (LGA)	Peace & Security; Patronage; Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
11.	Ministry of Housing & Urban Development (HUD)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
12.	State Emergency Management Agency (SEM)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
13.	Media (MED)	Curiosity; Leverage; prominence of their platform; prestige; recognition; revenues	M	M	L	H
14.	Academia (ACD)	Scholarship; respect and recognition; acknowledgement; prosperity	L	H	L	H
15.	Civil Society (CSO)	Donor Funding; Prominence; Leverage and Impact	M	H	L	H
16.	Organised Private Sector (OPS)	Better investment climate and opportunities; access to capital	L	H	L	H
17.	Key Private Interests (KPI) – Business and other Elites with strong connections in the corridors of power.	Better investment climate and opportunities; access to capital; Elite Capture of Value	H	H	H	H
18.	Traditional & Religious Institutions (TRI)	Improved security; attribution; elite capture of value	M	L	L	M
19.	Citizens (CTZ)	Escape from the harsh conditions of living in Nigeria	L	L	L	H

Index: P=Power; I=Interest; T=Potential for Threat; C=Potential for Cooperation

Power vs. Interest



Potential for Threat vs. Potential for Cooperation



Annexe 3: Kano State Level Analysis – Details


State Level Stakeholder Identification: Kano

Issue: Readiness to implement climate actions


	STAKEHOLDER GROUP	GENERIC INCENTIVES	P	I	T	C
1.	State Governor (GOV)	Climate Finance; Elite Capture of Value	H	M	M	M
2.	Ministry of Environment & Natural Resources (ENR)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
3.	Ministry of Justice (MOJ)	Water-tight agreements; turf protection	M	L	L	H
4.	State House of Assembly (SHA)	Access to funds; prominence and power	M	M	L	H
5.	Ministry of Water Resources (MWR)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
6.	Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
7.	Donors & Development Partners (DDP)	International Climate Finance; Stop unplanned migration; reduce harsh conditions of living in Nigeria	M	M	L	H
8.	Secretary to the State Government (SSG)	To satisfy the governor; Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	L	L	H
9.	State Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
10.	Ministry of Local Government Affairs (LGA)	Peace & Security; Patronage; Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
11.	Ministry of Housing & Urban Development (HUD)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
12.	State Emergency Management Agency (SEM)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
13.	Media (MED)	Curiosity; Leverage; prominence of their platform; prestige; recognition; revenues	M	M	L	H
14.	Academia (ACD)	Scholarship; respect and recognition; acknowledgement; prosperity	L	H	L	H
15.	Civil Society (CSO)	Donor Funding; Prominence; Leverage and Impact	M	H	L	H
16.	Organised Private Sector (OPS)	Better investment climate and opportunities; access to capital	L	H	L	H
17.	Key Private Interests (KPI) – Business and other Elites with strong connections in the corridors of power.	Better investment climate and opportunities; access to capital; Elite Capture of Value	H	H	H	H
18.	Traditional & Religious Institutions (TRI)	Improved security; attribution; elite capture of value	M	L	L	M
19.	Citizens (CTZ)	Escape from the harsh conditions of living in Nigeria	L	L	L	H
20.	State Governor (GOV)	Climate Finance; Elite Capture of Value	H	M	M	M
21.	Ministry of Environment & Natural Resources (ENR)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H

Index: P=Power; I=Interest; T=Potential for Threat; C=Potential for Cooperation

Power vs. Interest



Potential for Threat vs. Potential for Cooperation



Annexe 4: Jigawa State Level Analysis – Details


State Level Stakeholder Identification: Jigawa

Issue: Readiness to implement climate actions


STAKEHOLDER GROUP		GENERIC INCENTIVES	P	I	T	C
1.	State Governor (GOV)	Climate Finance; Elite Capture of Value	H	M	M	M
2.	Ministry of Environment & Natural Resources (ENR)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
3.	Ministry of Justice (MOJ)	Water-tight agreements; turf protection	M	L	L	H
4.	State House of Assembly (SHA)	Access to funds; prominence and power	M	M	L	H
5.	Ministry of Water Resources (MWR)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
6.	Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
7.	Donors & Development Partners (DDP)	International Climate Finance; Stop unplanned migration; reduce harsh conditions of living in Nigeria	M	M	L	H
8.	Secretary to the State Government (SSG)	To satisfy the governor; Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	L	L	H
9.	State Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
10.	Ministry of Local Government Affairs (LGA)	Peace & Security; Patronage; Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
11.	Ministry of Housing & Urban Development (HUD)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
12.	State Emergency Management Agency (SEM)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H
13.	Media (MED)	Curiosity; Leverage; prominence of their platform; prestige; recognition; revenues	M	M	L	H
14.	Academia (ACD)	Scholarship; respect and recognition; acknowledgement; prosperity	L	H	L	H
15.	Civil Society (CSO)	Donor Funding; Prominence; Leverage and Impact	M	H	L	H
16.	Organised Private Sector (OPS)	Better investment climate and opportunities; access to capital	L	H	L	H
17.	Key Private Interests (KPI) – Business and other Elites with strong connections in the corridors of power.	Better investment climate and opportunities; access to capital; Elite Capture of Value	H	H	H	H
18.	Traditional & Religious Institutions (TRI)	Improved security; attribution; elite capture of value	M	L	L	M
19.	Citizens (CTZ)	Escape from the harsh conditions of living in Nigeria	L	L	L	H
20.	State Governor (GOV)	Climate Finance; Elite Capture of Value	H	M	M	M
21.	Ministry of Environment & Natural Resources (ENR)	Budgetary Allocations; turf protection	M	M	L	H

Index: P=Power; I=Interest; T=Potential for Threat; C=Potential for Cooperation

Power vs. Interest



Potential for Threat vs. Potential for Cooperation



Annexe 5: State Diagnostic Work – Details

State of the State Reform Commitment – Situational Analysis on selected Reform Levers, across KJ States

The following table provides a ‘situational analysis’ of the current status of commitment in the three locations, Kaduna, Kano, and Jigawa, to **governance and climate change reforms of concern to the programme**. These were outlined in the team’s Technical Proposal, but provisional, with the expectation of being further developed during inception, as the basis for an annual assessment, to be included in the programme’s Results Framework (RF).

This analysis does not constitute a baseline assessment. The ‘**State of the State Reform Commitment**’ **Assessment** tool will be fully developed after inception, once the programme RF and Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) strategy have been finalised (in Dec 2024) and approved (in Jan 2025). This will define the purpose and scope of this assessment in the wider context of programme outcome level assessments. The current plan is to develop, and field test this assessment tool in time for the June 2025 programme Annual Review. It is expected to build on the experience and lessons learnt from the PERL Governance Assessment, Constituency Influence Assessment, and related or predecessor assessments like the PFM-RA and PEFA.

The expectation for now, is that this inception **state diagnostic work** will make use of some of the **reform levers** proposed for the annual assessment tool, to generate a **situational analysis** contributing to the inception PEA, but also test the utility of these reform levers, to assist in their subsequent development, including through their modification or the introduction of additional, alternative reform levers.

The **following five reform levers**, out of the 12 originally proposed, were selected for the inception PEA & State Diagnosis (TOR5), with the situational analysis to be drawn also from the findings of the inception Assessment of Climate Change Risk & Adaptation (TOR6):

- Overall Planning & Budgeting Framework
- Civil Society Engagement in Planning & Budget
- Climate Change Policy Framework
- Active Climate Change Adaptation Plan
- Active Climate Change Coalitions

All concerned expressed an interest in including analysis of ‘Internal Revenue from Climate Change’, the scope of which was broadened to ‘**Green Revenue Generation**’, on which state diagnostic work had already commenced for the inception Climate Environment Review and Strategy (TOR7).

In all then, a situational analysis of state reform commitment is provided against **6 reform levers**:

Reform Lever	Principle Source & Focus	Summary of Findings
Overall Planning & Budgeting Framework	PERL 2024 MSC Summary & Synthesis Papers on Budget Process, SFTAS, etc, 2024 Governance Assessment, and 2024 PCR ARIES report – focus: systemic accountability, responsiveness and capability	Budget Performance: In all three states there have seen large and sustained improvements in budget performance in recent years as measured by the ratio of actual expenditure to budgeted expenditure outturn (Figure 1). While performance in Jigawa and Kano continued to show improvement during the political transition in 2023, it declined in Kaduna however, in stark contrast to the improvement seen in Kaduna in 2019, the previous election year:
		Budget Realism: In all three states the capacities of key stakeholders to carry out fiscal forecasting have been enhanced, leading to better fiscal management, budget realism and improved budget performance. <u>Kaduna</u> has excelled in budget realism, with reduced deviation (now minimal) between 2024 budget estimates in the MTEF, Executive Budget Proposal and the Approved Budget. In <u>Kano</u>, revenue and expenditure forecasts have both become more accurate, ensuring a robust MTEF. In 2023 IGR exceeded original estimates by 2%, while FAAC revenue recorded a modest shortfall of 9%. <u>Jigawa</u> has maintained a commendable track record in budget performance, with revenue in 2023 achieving 149% of the original budget, and expenditure 106%. Consistency has fostered trust and reliability in its PFM. All three states also have their budgeting challenges. The new administration in <u>Kaduna</u> has inherited a legacy of improved governance systems and civil service capacity built by the previous Governor, El-Rufai, but also debt management problems. In <u>Kano</u>, PFM systems are increasingly responsive and inclusive but also suffer from constant budget amendments under the new administration. While that of <u>Jigawa</u> has inherited high performing state IGR (due to realistic target setting), but also civil service manpower challenges.
		Budget Documentation & Presentation: The capacity of key actors to produce timely and complete budget documents has increased in all three states in recent years. All three states are now presenting their budgets in line with the National Chart of Accounts (NCA). <u>Jigawa</u> has fully implemented the programme segment of the NCA in the 2023 and 2024 budgets, enabling disaggregation of spending on women and girls in the health and education sectors. This makes Jigawa State the most advanced of the 36 States (and Federal Government) to date in the application of the programme segment coding.
		Policy Budget Linkages: Since 2016, all three states have achieved stronger alignment between their state and sector development policies and plans and annual budgets. State development planning processes, MTSSs, sectoral annual operation plans and local government development plans (in <u>Kaduna</u> only) have been consistently strengthened. This has led to increased and more reliable budgetary allocations to critical sectors. The institutional and legal framework for PFM

		in <u>Kano</u> showed a marked improvement between 2017 and 2022, and sustained implementation and regulatory compliance in 2023 and 2024. Effective Budget Utilization, Enhancing Public Service Delivery: Between 2017 and 2024, increased budget allocation and budget performance contributed to substantial improvements in basic education services in <u>Kaduna</u> and <u>Jigawa</u>. These stemmed from core governance reforms, changes in policy and increased citizens engagement in all aspects of the budget cycle in both states. Over the same period, significant health financing reforms were seen in <u>Kano</u>, facilitated by the establishment and expansion of health insurance schemes and citizen advocacy promoting the inclusion of vulnerable groups. This development also benefited from Kano's initiative to distinguish girls' education and female health in the budget, later adopted by other states, benefiting Kaduna and Jigawa. SFTAS Performance: many of the findings above were independently validated by Annual Performance Assessments for the World Bank’s SFTAS Program for Results. All three states have been among the top 25% performers in the two most recent assessments. The percentage and value of Disbursement Linked Results achieved by the three states on SFTAS is shown in Figure 2: <u>Kaduna</u> achieved consistently good performance for budget and expenditure performance, publication of budget documents, citizens inputs into the budget, management of expenditure arrears, procurement and e-procurement. <u>Kano</u> achieved much improved budget and expenditure performance, publication of citizens’ input into the budget, procurement and e-procurement and debt management. <u>Jigawa</u> performed well across nearly all aspects of the annual performance assessment and has been a lead recipient of SFTAS grants.																																											
		<table><thead><tr><th>State</th><th>Year</th><th>Percentage (%)</th><th>Value (\$m)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">Kaduna</td><td>2018</td><td>~65%</td><td>\$11m</td></tr><tr><td>2019</td><td>~58%</td><td>\$5.6m</td></tr><tr><td>2020</td><td>~88%</td><td>\$20.6m</td></tr><tr><td>2021</td><td>100%</td><td>\$8.8m</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Kano</td><td>2018</td><td>~15%</td><td>\$2m</td></tr><tr><td>2019</td><td>~12%</td><td>\$26m</td></tr><tr><td>2020</td><td>~65%</td><td>\$19.3m</td></tr><tr><td>2021</td><td>~70%</td><td>\$14.1m</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Jigawa</td><td>2018</td><td>~42%</td><td>\$5.5m</td></tr><tr><td>2019</td><td>~88%</td><td>\$14.1m</td></tr><tr><td>2020</td><td>~75%</td><td>\$19.6m</td></tr><tr><td>2021</td><td>~62%</td><td>\$11.3m</td></tr></tbody></table>	State	Year	Percentage (%)	Value (\$m)	Kaduna	2018	~65%	\$11m	2019	~58%	\$5.6m	2020	~88%	\$20.6m	2021	100%	\$8.8m	Kano	2018	~15%	\$2m	2019	~12%	\$26m	2020	~65%	\$19.3m	2021	~70%	\$14.1m	Jigawa	2018	~42%	\$5.5m	2019	~88%	\$14.1m	2020	~75%	\$19.6m	2021	~62%	\$11.3m
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[Planning & Budgeting Transparency]		Deferred until assessment in 2025, covering: Improvements in Budget Transparency; Open Data Initiatives; OGP; etc																																											
[Planning & Budgeting Scrutiny]		Deferred until assessment in 2025, covering: Legislative Oversight; Monitoring & Evaluation; Audit Performance; etc																																											
[Timely Transparent Accounting]		Deferred until assessment in 2025, covering: Adherence to Budget Process & Timeline; Alignment with Fiscal Transparency Objectives; Rapid Annual Assessment; etc																																											

Non-State Actors Engagement in Planning & Budget	PERL 2024 MSC Summary & Synthesis Papers on Citizen Budgeting, 2024 Constituency Influence Assessment, and 2024 PCR ARIES report – focus: citizens engagement, representation and inclusion	Citizen Participation: across the three states, recent improvements in public services have benefited from transformational, systems-wide changes in budget processes institutionalising state-wide citizens engagement in all aspects of PFM, particularly in <u>Kaduna</u> and <u>Jigawa</u>. All three states have developed and institutionalised mechanisms to ensure greater citizen participation in determining budget priorities and tracking budget implementation. In <u>Kaduna</u> there are now ‘co-created’ state-led accountability mechanisms and processes in place facilitating inclusive citizen engagement in state governance in key sectors and across all local governments. <u>Jigawa</u> now has a strong, state-wide network of grassroots CSOs and citizens groups in place, respected by government, integrated into state PFM processes. <u>Kano</u> now has strong citizen engagement at sub-state levels via traditional structures, channelling citizens voice, triggering government response, but this is not systemic or transformational. Citizen’s Influence on Public Project Execution: In 2017 <u>Kaduna</u> State introduced Community Development Charters (CDC) to facilitate state-wide, cross-sectoral, citizens’ involvement in public planning and budgeting processes. This initiative has since been replicated (and customised/contextualised) in Jigawa and Kano. Since 2019, budgets in all three states have become more focused on citizen priorities, with citizens having greater influence on spend. Between 2019 and 2023, levels of citizen influence and oversight of public projects included in the budget went up from 21% to 40% in <u>Kaduna</u>, and from 5.4% to 54% in <u>Jigawa</u>. This means that these states are now using more of their own resources to finance their own health and education service delivery projects, decreasing reliance on external support. A new citizens-led application to automate and accelerate CDC ‘needs’ submission for consideration has been developed and accepted by the government and citizens in <u>Kaduna</u>. The CDC protocol and framework for this has been approved and institutionalised by government.									
Climate Change Policy Framework	NGCP ToR5, PEA RQ-8 for KIs on existing formal institutions; NGCP ToR6 Assessment of Climate Change Risk & Adaptation – final report based on FGD & survey questions (e.g. 28, 36-41, 44-46) eliciting relevant details of policies	KKJ states are responding to climate risks through a combination of policy, institutional, and programmatic interventions to enhance resilience and adaptation. These efforts include policy formulation, and institutional strengthening: Policy and Institutional Frameworks: Kaduna State recently approved a comprehensive Climate Change Policy, aligning with national and international objectives to mitigate climate impacts and promote sustainability. Similarly, the Kano Declaration on Climate Change and Environment, signed by Jigawa, Kaduna, and Kano representatives, underscores commitments to biodiversity conservation, adaptation financing, and sustainable development. Institutional support from the National Agency for the Great Green Wall (NAGGW) focuses on combating desertification and promoting ecological resilience. The overarching goal is to grow 8,000km of forest across 100 million hectares of degraded land by 2030 to tackle persistent droughts, food insecurity, migration, and conflict. The project is estimated to have achieved 15% of its goals and, after its completion, will have led to the largest living system on earth. Identified Gaps and Challenges: <table> <tr> <th>Category</th><th>Gaps</th><th>Challenges</th></tr> <tr> <td>Policy</td><td>Limited integration of climate risks into sectoral policies.</td><td>Fragmented implementation of existing climate policies across sectors and states.</td></tr> <tr> <td></td><td>Weak enforcement of environmental regulations.</td><td>Lack of alignment between state-level policies and the federal National Adaptation Plan (NAP).</td></tr> </table>	Category	Gaps	Challenges	Policy	Limited integration of climate risks into sectoral policies.	Fragmented implementation of existing climate policies across sectors and states.		Weak enforcement of environmental regulations.	Lack of alignment between state-level policies and the federal National Adaptation Plan (NAP).
Category	Gaps	Challenges									
Policy	Limited integration of climate risks into sectoral policies.	Fragmented implementation of existing climate policies across sectors and states.									
	Weak enforcement of environmental regulations.	Lack of alignment between state-level policies and the federal National Adaptation Plan (NAP).									
[Climate Change Declarations]		Deferred until assessment in 2025									


Active Climate Change Adaptation Plan	NGCP ToR5, PEA RQ-8 for KIs on existing formal institutions; NGCP ToR6 Assessment of Climate Change Risk & Adaptation – final report based on FGD & survey questions (e.g. 28, 36-41, 44-46) eliciting relevant details of plans	KKJ states are responding to climate risks through a combination of policy, institutional, and programmatic interventions to enhance resilience and adaptation. These efforts include planning, strategic initiatives and community engagement: State Level Planning: Since the official launch of <u>Kaduna’s</u> climate policy, the state government has not developed an implementation plan. However, there are plans for an FCDO Programme to fund the implementation plan's development and the Kaduna MAF sets out government commitments and donor offers to ‘strengthen climate change resilience and promote sustainable development by implementing effective mitigation and adaptation strategies’ (Deliverable 4: Env). In <u>Kano</u>, the Executive of the new climate change agency, WECCMA, envisages development of an implementation plan and a stakeholder engagement plan as their next step, while it carries out existing planned activities, including mitigations. <u>Jigawa</u> state has yet to develop a comprehensive, standalone climate change policy, though its existing policies (on environmental protection, desertification control, and water management) broadly align with national climate policies and plans. The state’s Ministry of Environment oversees climate and ecological initiatives, though it faces resource and capacity limitations hindering effective climate action and adaptation planning. National Integration: At the federal level, the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) developed with support from the Green Climate Fund readiness programme ensures a cohesive approach to embedding climate adaptation into <u>subnational planning processes, directly benefiting the KKJ states</u>. This is complemented by Kaduna’s inclusion of climate priorities in its policy framework, demonstrating a commitment to sustained resilience building. Strategic Initiatives: Programs like ACREsAL enhance resilience through sustainable land management and climate-smart agriculture, addressing the vulnerabilities of farming communities. The UK-supported Propcom+ program also introduces climate-smart agricultural innovations, such as the System of Rice Intensification (SRI), enabling farmers to increase productivity and reduce emissions. These initiatives are complemented by efforts to scale biofortified crops like vitamin A maize and iron pearl millet through projects led by HarvestPlus, which improve food security and nutrition while enhancing climate resilience. The Africa Development Bank’s (AfDB) newly launched USD25 billion (EUR25 billion) Africa Adaptation Acceleration Program (AAP). Eventually, the AAP will unlock financing from African governments, investors, foundations, resilience bonds and debt for climate adaptation swaps. Community Engagement and Education: Local radio services, such as the Climate and Nutritious Crop Hausa Radio Service, disseminate knowledge on climate-smart practices, ensuring that farmers in KKJ states have access to critical adaptation information. These efforts bridge knowledge gaps, empowering communities to act on climate challenges. Identified Gaps and Challenges: The impact of ongoing climate adaptation plans and initiatives across the KKJ states has been mixed, reflecting progress alongside persistent challenges. Programmes such as ACREsAL and Propcom+ have demonstrated measurable improvements in agricultural productivity and community resilience. However, their effectiveness is constrained by resource availability and mobilization gaps. Financial allocations for state-level climate action remain insufficient, with heavy reliance on external funding from development partners. Institutional capacity for implementation and monitoring of adaptation plans also needs to catch up, particularly in resource-scarce rural areas.
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		Category	Gaps	Challenges
		Capacity	Inadequate technical expertise for implementing advanced climate-smart solutions.	Limited institutional capacity to monitor and evaluate climate interventions.
			Insufficient community-level training and awareness on adaptation practices.	High turnover and low retention of skilled personnel in state institutions.
		Finance	Heavy reliance on donor funding for climate initiatives.	Insufficient state budgets allocated to climate adaptation and resilience efforts.
			Lack of access to dedicated climate finance mechanisms, such as green bonds or adaptation funds.	Inadequate financial incentives for private sector investment in climate-resilient infrastructure.
		Technology	Limited access to affordable climate-smart technologies, such as irrigation and weather data tools.	High cost and poor maintenance of technology solutions deployed in rural areas.
			Low adoption of renewable energy solutions in climate-vulnerable communities.	Inconsistent technological infrastructure, including poor internet and power supply in remote areas.
Active Climate Change Coalitions	NGCP ToR5, PEA RQs 9-12 for KIIs on key actors, stakeholder mapping, plausible pathways of change; NGCP ToR6, Assessment of Climate Change Risk & Adaptation – final report based on FGD & survey questions (e.g. 36-41) eliciting relevant details of any current coalitions	Kaduna: The closest thing to a <u>coalition of state and non-state actors</u> working on climate related issues is the Network of Civil Society on Environment (NCSE, led by Gloria Bulus), though this consists mainly of CSO/NGOs. One of these NGOs, Savanna Conservation Nigeria (SCN), has a separate working partnership with the Ministry of Environment. Professional bodies interested in climate issues in Kaduna state include the Association of Quantity Surveyors and Council for Regulation of Engineers in Nigeria. In the <u>media</u> space there are no coalitions as such, but several major stations (NAN, Liberty, Invicta, FRCN) with programmes covering climate related issues. They work with NCSE and are embedded in state-led accountability mechanisms. Others include the Sun Newspaper and Africa Media Dev Foundation. Kano: The closest thing to a <u>multi-stakeholder climate change coalition</u> here is the recently formed Kano OGP Climate Change Committee, co-created by government and citizens groups cutting across the ‘whole of society’. CSO/NGOs and professional bodies with a strong climate related mandate or focus in Kano include the Centre for Environment & Rural Development (CERD), National Environmental Society (NES), Nigerian Meteorological Association (NMA), and Climate and Sustainable Development Network (CSDevNet). In the <u>media</u> space there are several major stations (Freedom, Express, Solace Base, VoA) covering climate related issues, and a few Environment/Climate dedicated platforms: ‘Baraka on Environment’ on Muhalli Radio-Online and the Afruith Podcast on ‘Environment and Rural Development’. In the academic/research space, Bayero University Kano has a Centre for Renewable Energy, which held an international conference on climate change in 2023, and a Centre for Dryland Agriculture (CDA) which provides training and research relating to food security. It is not known whether any of these organisations have formed strategic partnerships or come together as coalitions with other state and non-state actors within or outside the state. Jigawa: There several <u>multi-stakeholder coalitions</u> here on specific climate related issues. These include: various inter-community, inter-LG and inter-state fora convened by the Wetlands Development Initiative (WDI, based in Hadejia, formerly supported by DFID (through the Joint Wetlands Livelihoods project), and the Nigeria Conservation Foundation (through the Hadejia-Nguru Wetlands Conservation Project) working on wetlands conservation, seasonal flooding and		

		herder-farmer conflict issues; a Transhumance Coalition for managing herder-farmer relations across state borders; and the Network of Jigawa Civil Societies advocating on various issues, across sectors, including environment. CSO/CBOs with a climate related mandate or focus work primarily on tree-planting and environmental sanitation (WASH) initiatives, mostly through <u>community-based self-help groups</u>: e.g. Gumel Community Initiative for Green & Clean Environment (GCIGCE), and Birnin-Kudu Progressive Forum on tree-planting (working in partnership with the Emirate authorities). In the <u>media</u> space there are several major stations (Radio Freedom, Radio Jigawa, Horizon FM, Daily Trust, Leadership, Channels TV) covering climate issues, especially flooding, with a few dedicated environment/climate programmes. At the National level, there are many more <u>coalitions, networks, platforms and partnerships</u> addressing climate change as a whole or specific climate issues. At the highest level these include: the Nigerian Climate Change Forum (NCCF, chaired by the Director General & Chief Executive of the Energy Commission of Nigeria, sponsored by NNPC and the Africa Finance Corporation) focussed on innovation and technology showcasing, financing renewable energy and CCS projects, and nature-based solutions for carbon sequestration (https://nigeriaclimatechangeforum.com/) and the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG) which facilitates public-private sector dialogue between business and industry leaders with government and political leaders, on national economic issues, including those affected by climate change. In the <u>civil society</u> space, the International Climate Change Development Initiative (ICCDI, https://www.iccdiafrica.org/ founded in 2013) was a leading country climate NGO that aims to create climate-smart generations in Africa, working on issues such as climate change and disaster risk reduction, sustainable agriculture, and renewable energy, but has been less active in recent years following the departure of leading members. Others include: the Centre for Climate Change and Sustainability Development (3CSD); Nigeria Youth Climate Coalition (NYCC); CCDI Community (<u>supported by the Heinrich Boll Foundation?</u>); Earth Advocacy and Empowerment Foundation; and Climate Change Network Nigeria (CCN Nigeria). In the <u>media</u> space at the national level, there are several radio and TV stations covering climate related issues, e.g. Channels TV (Eco Africa programme), Enviro News Nigeria (online platform focusing on environmental development issues), Guardian Newspaper, News Agency of Nigeria (NAN), and FRCN. A leading media coalition/platform in this space was the Centre for Excellence on Climate Change Media Reporting (<u>founded in 20??</u>, with British Council support), now disbanded, though leading members continue to build on its legacy, e.g. Michael Simire of Enviro News Nigeria.
Green Revenue Generation [formerly Internal Revenue from Climate Change]	NGCP ToR7, Climate Environment Review & Strategy – eliciting relevant details on the fiscal space and resources availability for climate change expenditure in KKJ state and at Federal level	Federal Allocations: Over the last three years, Kano, Kaduna and Jigawa (KKJ) on average depended on the highly volatile Federation Account Allocation (FAAC) for over 60% of the revenue needed for government expenditure. The removal of the fuel subsidy expected to free up resources (mineral revenues) for distribution through FAAC has created the need for States to provide palliatives to the most disadvantaged citizens and increased the cost of living. Kano State has included the provision of N2.5 billion in its draft 2025 budget for palliatives whilst Kaduna has included N1.75 billion. The potential increase to FAAC allocations based on the removal of the subsidy is considerably higher than this (N30-40 billion per State) but its impact on the standard of living and public trust needs to be re-evaluated. Exchange Rate Devaluation: The value of the Naira on the foreign exchange market has plummeted since the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) adopted a free-floating exchange rate in early 2024. This has caused the price of imported goods to surge, and with what appears to be a full removal of the subsidy and the jump of PMS pump prices to N1,030.46 per litre in September, indicating a 64.55% increase compared to the value recorded in September 2023 (N626.21) and 525% more

than the price of N164.85 in September 2022. **The devaluation of the naira which is now floating in the range of 1,600-1,700 to the US Dollar**, has led to sharp increases in the naira value of crude oil sales revenue and mineral revenue distributable through FAAC with a causal increase in the rate of inflation, increases in the cost of servicing foreign debt, which have rather constricted the fiscal space in real terms and crowded out investment in human capital and developmental projects.

Steady growth but surge in inflation - after a strong bounce back in 2021 from a COVID-19-induced recession, quarterly Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth has been in the range of 2-4% since Quarter 3 (Q3) 2021. According to the latest GDP reports issued by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in late August, Real GDP growth for 2024 Quarter 2 was 3.19% - driven by higher crude oil production (oil sector growth was 10.15% year-on-year). Non-oil GDP grew by 2.80% year on year. For PACE partner States, the issue of foreign debt service is significant for Kaduna who has the second highest debt stock amongst the 36 States (US \$640 million, which equates to circa N1 trillion). Jigawa by comparison only has US \$25 million (less than 5% of Kaduna's foreign debt).



As evidenced in various FAAC Reports, a significant proportion of mineral revenue is currently being used to fund derivation refunds to the crude oil producing States. This is depressing the resources available for distribution through FAAC, impacting non-oil producing States (including the PACE Partner States), and is likely to continue for at least another 15-18 months. As of the end of December 2023, the total debt stock for the PACE partner states was N1,331.83 trillion of which Kaduna had N966.13 billion, Kano – N284.24 billion while Jigawa had N81.45 billion. As shown in the figure fiscal space chart below, Kaduna state, though with higher IGR potential, is challenged by high debt service cost at 23% of total

recurrent expenditure². Kano state IGR to recurrent revenue ratio is 31% while for Jigawa, debt service cost accounted for only 3% of the recurrent expenditure in 2023. Opportunities for effective climate change policy initiatives are likely to be inhibited by shrinking fiscal space and without pragmatic multi-sectoral climate change governance, addressing climate change impacts and promoting just energy transition will be difficult.

Estimates of Fiscal Space for Climate Responsive Expenditures in 2025 (all figures in Billion Naira):

[Plans Underway to Issue Green Bonds]		Item	Kaduna	Kano	Jigawa	Notes
		FAAC Revenues	202.93	258.51	173.76	Based on NGF Advisory Note to States from September 2024
		IGR	57.32	38.61	24.55	25% increment from 2024 Full Year Estimates (Based on grossing up 2024 Q3 YTD figures)
		Grants	20.00	20.00	20.00	Estimates Based on Resource Availability
		PforR Loans	20.00	20.00	20.00	Estimates Based on Resource Availability
		Total Resources*	300.25	337.12	218.31	Calculated
		15% Health	45.04	50.57	35.75	Calculated
		25% Education	75.06	84.28	59.58	Calculated
		Other Personnel Costs	36.84	42.96	-	Based on 2025 Budget reflecting minimum wage
		Debt Service	74.87	26.99	5.00	Based on DSA/2025 Budget
		Total Committed Expenditures	231.81	204.80	100.32	Calculated
		Balance for Discretionary Expenditure	68.44	132.33	137.98	Calculated
		Likely Capital Expenditure Carry Forward	72.00	80.00		Estimates Based on 2024 Q3 BPR
		*Does not include commercial borrowing and Opening Balance				
		[Plans Underway to Issue Green Bonds]		Deferred until assessment in 2025		

² Note – IGR/RRev - the ratio of IGR/Recurrent Revenue ratio – the share of IGR in the total recurrent revenue (FAAC plus internally generated revenue).
Debt Serv/Rec. Exp. – Debt service to recurrent expenditure ratio – the ratio of debt service cost to recurrent expenditure (salaries & overheads).

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